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Preface 
 
This report is based on a request for a tariff reform study by the Ministry of Economy and 
Foreign Trade (MEFT) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to the Development 
Economic Policy Reform Analysis (DEPRA) Project, under contract to the United States 
Agency for International Development, Cairo, Egypt (USAID/Egypt) (Contract No. 263-
C-00-96-00001-00). 
 
The DEPRA project is intended to encourage and support economic reform in Egypt 
through the provision of technical assistance and services to the MEFT with particular 
focus on international trade and investment liberalization, deregulation and financial 
sector strengthening. 
 
The study objective was to evaluate the technical viability of tariff liberalization in Egypt 
and possible implementation strategies. The report is being published in two volumes:  
Volume I contains the main report and Volume II contains Annexes I - V. The report was 
compiled and authored as follows: Main Report: Dr. Montague Lord, team leader; Annex 
I–Design Options and Sequencing: Mr. Sarath Rajapatirana, international consultant; 
Annex II–Direct and Macroeconomic Consequences: Ms. Greta Boye, international 
consultant; Annex III–Industry-Level Analysis: Dr. James Cassing, international 
consultant, with the collaboration of Dr. Alia El Mahdi, local consultant, Dr. Fatma El 
Hamidi, international consultant, Dr. Iman Mohamed Ahmed, local consultant, Dr. Omar 
Salman and Ms. Nabila Al Iskandarani, local consultant; Annex IV–Fiscal Revenue 
Implications: Dr. Montague Lord, team leader; Annex V–Global Consequences: Dr. 
Joseph Francois, international consultant. All team members benefited greatly from 
extensive data and economic information provided by Dr. Suzanne Messiha and the 
Comp Team of DEPRA The report was prepared under contract with Nathan Associates 
Inc.  
 
The team would like to thank the staff at MEFT and MOF for their support. The authors 
are solely responsible for all opinions expressed in this report, and the conclusions and 
recommendations do not necessarily reflect opinions or policies of either the Government 
of Egypt or the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 
This study evaluates the technical feasability of tariff liberalization in Egypt and possible 
implementation strategies. It has been undertaken on behalf of the Ministry of Economy 
and Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Finance by a consulting team of the Development 
Economic Policy Reform Analysis Project (DEPRA). The overall purpose of this study is 
to provide the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Finance with 
advice on how to proceed with tariff reform in a manner that is economically and 
technically viable, supportive of the Government’s overall reform program objectives and 
responsive to private sector needs.  
 
The guidelines for examining alternative tariff liberalization strategies that were 
communicated to the study team have been that (a) tariff reforms should be as revenue-
neutral as possible, (b) the reforms should cause as few disruptions to employment as 
possible, and (c) the reforms should have a minimal effect on Egypt’s important 
industries. As such, the study aims to develop an action plan for implementing a new 
round of tariff reform that addresses the fiscal revenue, industrial production and labor 
adjustment issues of the Egyptian economy. The emphasis is on a practical, action-
oriented plan, rather than an academic study. 
 
Study Coverage 
 
This executive summary provides a brief overview of the six-part study on the Economic 
Analysis of Tariff Reform in Egypt.1  The main report, in Volume I, summarizes the 
results of the study. Volume II contains five annexes, which make up the analytical 
portion of this study. The annexes begin by examining the deficiencies in the present 
trade regime and the specific reform agenda that would address those deficiencies (Annex 
1). The study then proceeds to quantify the economic effects of the proposed areas of 
reform focusing on the direct trade effects of tariff changes and the transmission of those 
trade effects to the economy (Annex II).  
 
                                                 
1 The study was carried out under the direction of Dr. James Walker, DEPRA Trade Liberalization Advisor, 
Dr. John Suomela, DEPRA Senior Trade Policy Advisor, and Dr. Hafiz Shaltout, USAID/COTR. The 
authors of the volumes that make up the present report are as follows: Main Report: Dr. Montague Lord, 
team leader; Annex I–Design Options and Sequencing: Mr. Sarath Rajapatirana, international consultant; 
Annex II–Direct and Macroeconomic Consequences: Ms. Greta Boye, international consultant; Annex III–
Industry-Level Analysis: Dr. James Cassing, international consultant, with the collaboration of Dr. Fatma 
El Hamidi, international consultant, and the following local consultants: Dr. Alia El Mahdi, Dr. Iman 
Mohamed Ahmed, Dr. Omar Salman and Ms. Nabila Al Iskandarani; Annex IV–Fiscal Revenue 
Implications: Dr. Montague Lord, team leader; Annex V–Global Consequences: Dr. Joseph Francois, 
international consultant. All team members benefited greatly from extensive data and economic 
information provided by Dr. Suzanne Messiha and the Comp Team of DEPRA. 
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The results of the national-level detailed product analysis are used in the next part of the 
study to evaluate the impact of alternative reform strategies on industries (Annex III). As 
part of the industry-specific analysis, the study evaluates labor- and capital-specific 
adjustment magnitudes and experiences. 
 
The revenue implications of tariff reforms are considered in a macroeconomic model 
(Annex IV). Since exchange rate adjustments often accompany trade policy reforms, we 
also consider exchange rate adjustments that could be revenue-enhancing by removing or 
reducing currency over-valuation. If trade balances initially worsen with tariff reductions, 
a devaluation could forestall the need for offsetting adjustments to fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
 
The study then uses an economy-wide model (Annex V) to determine likely trade and 
real income shifts in Egypt’s participation in the globalization process. The results 
provide useful insights into the likely economy-wide adjustment magnitudes and 
adjustment experience under a complete reform of tariffs and taxes. 
 
Following a review of the coverage and major findings of the analytical components of 
the study, the present volume lays out a strategy for designing and implementing tariff 
reforms in terms of the underlying principles for such a reform, the cost of non-
adjustment, the social benefits versus private costs, the options for liberalizing trade, 
complementary measures, and the sequencing and timing of those reforms. Although the 
optimum path for liberalizing trade is one that maximizes net social benefits, 
consideration is also given to individual effects of the reform measures.  
 
Existing Tariff Structure 
 
Egypt has implemented six major reforms to its tariff structure since the introduction of 
the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991. Tariff 
reductions have generally followed the so-called concertina method, whereby the highest 
rates are lowered to the next highest level. However, tariffs below 30 percent have not 
been adjusted downward since 1994 and the most recent set of reductions reflect an 
apparent shift away from a strategy of overall tariff reductions towards one based on a 
targeted sector-based reductions.  
 
Overall, the trade-weighted average tariff of Egypt is 20 percent (Table ES1). This rate is 
higher than in any earlier year since the mid-
1990s and it reflects a tariff structure with a 
wide dispersion of tariffs, tariff escalation, 
tariff peaks, an anti-export bias, and a high 
proportion of tariff lines that are in sensitive 
sectors. Continued application of the present 
tariff and trade regime would not permit Egypt 
to exploit its comparative advantage in the 
production of labor-intensive manufactures, 
Table ES1: Trade-Weighted Average  
Tariffs of Egypt, 1995/96-1998/99 
1995/96 18.8% 
1996/97 18.3% 
1997/98 17.9% 
1998/99 20.2% 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics.  
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x 
since the present tariff regime draws resources away from such activities. 
 
Tariff Reform Strategies 
 
To provide the GOE with the broadest set of alternatives, we have examined the 
consequences of restructuring Egypt’s tariffs using the five commonly applied reform 
strategies:  
 
? Free Trade. Although not an often-adopted option, this strategy serves as a 
benchmark for comparing the consequences of other strategies.  
 
? Concertina Method. This strategy aims to gradually reduce individual tariffs from 
their highest level to their next lowest level. In many countries it is often used to 
move towards the implementation of a uniform tariff.  
 
? Two-Tier Method. This strategy represents a simple form of tariff escalation, which 
promotes infant industries and those industries with export potential by allowing their 
inputs to be taxed at a lower rate than competing finished products.  
 
? Uniform Tariff. We examine the effects of a single tariff that is revenue neutral. 
Revenue neutrality in this case is estimated from the direct (partial equilibrium) 
effects of the tariff, although it is also possible to adopt a revenue neutral strategy at 
the macroeconomic level that would account for the feedback effects from tariff 
reforms.  
 
? Combination of Two-Tier and Uniform Tariff Strategies. This combination affords 
domestic industries transitional protection while moving towards a uniform tariff.  
 
Direct and Macroeconomic Impact Effects 
 
Two types of models are used in this study to examine alternative tariff strategies for 
Egypt. The first, based on partial equilibrium analysis, provides detailed product 
information on the direct impact of trade liberalization. The second, based on a 
macroeconomic framework, captures the dynamic feedback effects between import 
adjustments and the macro-economy. These two approaches complement one another 
insofar as the first allows us to compare the direct effects of alternative strategies on the 
structure of imports, while the second lets us assess the effects of those alternative 
strategies on the national income and financial accounts, as well as the government 
budget. The results of the partial equilibrium analysis indicate the following: 
 
Concertina Method. This approach would reduce the number of tariff bands from 21 to 6 
and would also reduce the trade-weighted average tariff for the products selected for this 
analysis from 18 percent to 13 percent. Applying a 21.5 percent GST on imports would 
bring about a neutral government revenue effect. 
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Two-Tier Method. The model was solved for a tariff to be applied to inputs of 14 percent 
that would have a revenue-neutral effect, and a 19 percent tariff for final products. A 
GST rate of 18.8 percent would result in a neutral government revenue effect compared 
with the base period. 
 
Uniform Tariff. A 15 percent uniform tariff would generate a revenue-neutral effect, and 
the government revenue effect would be neutral with a GST rate of 18.8 percent. The 
GST rate is similar to that of the two-tier method because of the similarity in the trade-
weighted average tariffs of the two reform strategies. 
 
Combination of Two-Tier and Uniform Tariff Strategies. The combination of a two-tier 
tariff structure in the first three years and a uniform tariff in the fourth and fifth years 
with the tariffs specified above and an 18.8 percent GST would yield a neutral 
government revenue effect. 
 
In general, the difference between the partial equilibrium and macroeconomic analyses 
arises from the transmission of trade adjustments to the open Egyptian economy and the 
feedback effects that these adjustments in the national income components have on trade. 
At the macroeconomic level the concertina, two-tier and uniform tariff strategies 
generally impact the Egyptian economy in similar ways because their average tariffs are 
quite similar (Table ES2). A lower overall tariff rate from its present high level would 
stimulate gross capital formation through domestic investment, which in turn would 
stimulate overall growth of the economy. The increased national income would further 
stimulate private consumption, while current expenditures of the Government contracted 
in response to lower trade tax revenue. The GOE would nevertheless receives 
compensation for the reduced trade tax revenue from increased tax revenue from other 
sources as a result of the private sector’s expanded economic activity and the 
aforementioned change in the GST rate.  
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TARIFF REFORM IN EGYPT 
 
VOLUME I: MAIN REPORT 
 
 
 
 
xii 
Table ES2 
Multiplier Analysis of Alternative Tariff Structures on Key Macroeconomic Variables
(Percent change and US dollars) 
Multiplier (%) 
Impact Interim Total 
  Unit of Account (1 year) (5 yrs) (20 years) 
Imports of goods       
Free Trade Nominal US$ 1.6% 5.1% 6.6%
Concertina Nominal US$ 0.2% 0.4% 0.6%
Two-Tier Nominal US$ 0.2% 0.5% 0.9%
Uniform Nominal US$ 0.2% 0.6% 0.6%
Combination Nominal US$ 0.3% 0.6% 0.9%
Imports of goods and nfs    
Free Trade Constant LE 1.1% 3.2% 4.2%
Concertina Constant LE 0.2% 0.4% 0.5%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.2% 0.4% 0.7%
Uniform Constant LE 0.2% 0.4% 0.7%
Combination Constant LE 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%
Trade tax revenue    
Free Trade Constant LE -30.8% -65.7% -93.6%
Concertina Constant LE -16.0% -19.2% -21.4%
Two-Tier Constant LE -8.0% -17.8% -25.2%
Uniform Constant LE -8.0% -17.8% -25.2%
Combination Constant LE -7.9% -17.7% -25.2%
Other tax revenue    
Free Trade Constant LE 0.1% 0.0% -1.5%
Concertina Constant LE 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Uniform Constant LE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Combination Constant LE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Gross capital formation    
Free Trade Constant LE 1.7% 4.3% 6.8%
Concertina Constant LE 0.7% 1.4% 1.8%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.4% 1.2% 2.0%
Uniform Constant LE 0.4% 1.2% 2.0%
Combination Constant LE 0.4% 1.1% 2.1%
Real GDP     
Free Trade Constant LE 0.1% -0.4% -1.8%
Concertina Constant LE 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
Uniform Constant LE 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Combination Constant LE 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
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Industry-Level Adjustments 
 
Disaggregation at the industry level reveals significant heterogeneity across sectors in 
terms of tariff protection and industry characteristics that include potential impediments 
to structural adjustments. The study calculates disaggregated estimates of effective rates 
of protection (ERPs) for the five alternative reform strategies, estimates supply 
elasticities for the selected industries, and uses the results to quantify the magnitude of 
the required tariff-induced output adjustment for each tariff strategy. Adjustment-related 
issues are also considered for factors of production, especially labor and foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  
 
Overall, the existing mean average ERP for the sample of 46 industries is 65 percent, a 
rate that is substantially higher than their already high average nominal tariff or rate of 
protection (NRP) of 25 percent. Agriculture-related industries have the highest mean 
average ERP (93 percent) of the three sectors, while public and private industrial 
activities have very similar average ERPs.  
 
The level of effective protection in the sample industries has been calculated under each 
of the alternative reform strategies, with the following results (Table ES3): 
 
? Free Trade: In the absence of any protection, all tariffs would be zero and so the 
NRPs and the ERPs would also be zero.  
 
Table ES3:  Industry-Level Effective Protection under Existing and Alternative Reforms  
(percent)  
  ERP under Alternative Reforms
 NRP ERP Two-Tier Concertina 
Sector Averages: 24.6 64.7 34.3 46.1 
  Agriculture 25.3 93.0 40.8 62.8 
  Industrial Public Sector 23.9 51.5 32.7 40.0 
  Industrial Private Sector 24.6 51.2 30.9 37.9 
Sector Standard Deviations: 13.9 75.4 16.4 52.8 
  Agriculture 19.0 110.9 21.7 75.6 
  Industrial Public Sector 10.9 39.0 10.2 35.9 
  Industrial Private Sector 10.4 37.5 9.3 25.6 
Source: Volume 5 of present study. 
 
? Uniform Tariffs: If all tariffs were to be set at the revenue neutral rate of 15 percent, 
then the ERP for each industry would equal the corresponding 15 percent NRP. The 
direction of the overall output effects would thus resemble free trade, a compelling 
argument for uniform tariffs, although the import-competing industries would still be 
favored over the exporting oriented industries.  
 
? Two-Tier Tariffs: The industry-level analysis adopted a tariff for outputs of 19 
percent and a tariff for inputs of 14 percent for all industries. Generally, the overall 
ERP would fall from 65 to 34 percent, with the greatest decline occurring in the 
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agricultural industries. For the more industrial sectors, both average ERPs of the 
public and private sectors would fall from 51 to 31 percent. 
 
? Concertina Tariff: In general, the concertina approach reduces the effective protection 
of the industries considerably less than any of the other reform strategies.  
 
The impact of reforms on the output response of the sample of industries was evaluated 
from supply estimates for each industry. The net effect on output and employment from 
the alternative reform strategies are the following: 
 
Uniform Tariff: With a 15 percent revenue neutral uniform tariff, output for the 
industrial sector would fall by nearly as much as under free trade. The decline 
would be caused by Egypt’s current tariff escalation: while output tariffs would be 
reduced, tariffs on tradable inputs would generally be higher, and the resulting 
cost increases would lead to output reductions.  
 
Concertina Tariff: This type of tariff structure generally causes the least 
contraction in import-competing firms. For industry final goods, tariffs would be 
maintained at relatively high rates, and input tariffs would be lowered, thereby 
reducing costs and encouraging output expansion 
 
Two-Tier Tariff: With tariffs of 14 percent for inputs and 19 percent for outputs, 
there would be a more modest output effect than with the uniform tariff since 
there are relatively higher output tariffs and lower input tariffs than with the 
uniform tariff reform. 
 
Factor Market Adjustments 
 
Drawing on both the present industry-level analysis and several studies commissioned by 
the DEPRA project, the annexes examine available evidence on the linkage between 
trade reform, labor and FDI. The evidence suggests that employment and wage effects of 
trade reform are generally small. First, labor is fairly dynamic in the face of change and 
real wages are relatively flexible. Second, the informal sector operates outside of much of 
the regulatory environment, and the lack of compliance and enforcement of labor market 
regulations allows labor markets to adjust quickly to changing circumstances. Third, 
trade reforms are often implemented in conjunction with other reforms, including broad-
based tax and exchange rate reforms that offset any short-term adjustment costs. Finally, 
there is clear evidence that trade reforms attract rather than dampen foreign investment 
because of the positive attitude towards foreign investment directed at export-oriented 
industries that often accompanies trade reform. 
 
Fiscal Revenue Implications 
 
Fiscal stabilization has been one of the key ingredients for the establishment of the 
fundamental conditions needed for Egypt’s macroeconomic stability. Since taxes on 
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international trade represent one-fifth of the GOE’s total tax revenue, any discussion of 
trade liberalization must weigh the fiscal revenue implications against efforts to further 
integrate the Egyptian economy into the global economy. Moreover, a new round of trade 
liberalization under the current nominal exchange rate anchor could aggravate the trade 
deficit and thereby undermine the external balance.  
 
It is in the context of the need to coordinate this broad set of macroeconomic stabilization 
and economic reform policies that the present study has included the design and 
estimation of a macroeconomic model to assess trade and exchange rate policy reforms. 
Table ES4 illustrates the effect of alternative tariff strategies on fiscal revenue and the 
GOE budget. The smaller expansion of imports under the alternative strategies than under 
complete free trade generates a lower trade deficit. Given the similarity in the average 
tariff rates among the various strategies, they produce little, if any, difference in their 
fiscal impact. 
 
Exchange Rate Adjustments during Trade Liberalization 
 
To counter the trade-balance effect of trade liberalization, the macroeconomic model was 
used to measure the effects of a devaluation on the Egyptian economy. The results 
support generalizations to the effect that the exchange rate significantly impacts on 
Egypt’s balance of payments (Table ES5). For fiscal revenue the results show that the 
elimination of the overvaluation of the Egyptian pound expands the share of trade taxes 
following the initial contraction and, because of the positive tax revenue effect, the 
devaluation leads to a medium-term improvement in the fiscal balance. Moreover, the 
elimination of the overvalued currency substantially expands the real value of imports. 
As a result, there are positive medium-term effects on the fiscal balance from the larger 
domestically priced tax base and the larger tax revenue generated from increased 
investment and consumption by the private sector. 
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Table ES4  
Impact of Alternative Tariff Structures on Key Macroeconomic Indicators 
(Annual percent change and average annual US dollars) 
  2000-2004 2005-2009 
Trade Balance (average annual Mil. US dollars)   
Current Tariff Structure                  (10,742)                  (14,570) 
Free Trade                  (11,596)                  (16,396) 
Concertina                  (10,811)                  (14,729) 
Two-Tier                  (10,829)                  (14,796) 
Uniform                  (10,835)                  (14,788) 
Combination                  (10,843)                  (14,795) 
Import Duties / Total Tax Revenue (percent)   
Current Tariff Structure 18.1% 16.4% 
Free Trade 6.4% 0.0% 
Concertina 15.1% 13.2% 
Two-Tier 15.4% 12.4% 
Uniform 15.4% 12.5% 
Combination 15.4% 12.5% 
Trade tax collection rate (duties/imports)   
Current Tariff Structure 17.9% 17.9% 
Free Trade 7.2% 0.0% 
Concertina 15.0% 13.1% 
Two-Tier 16.9% 16.3% 
Uniform 16.8% 16.1% 
Combination 16.5% 16.1% 
Import Duties / GDP (percent)   
Current Tariff Structure 3.1% 2.9% 
Free Trade 1.1% 0.0% 
Concertina 2.5% 2.2% 
Two-Tier 2.5% 2.2% 
Uniform 2.5% 2.1% 
Combination 2.5% 2.1% 
Fiscal deficit / GDP (percent)    
Current Tariff Structure -1.5% -2.4% 
Free Trade -2.9% -3.9% 
Concertina -1.9% -2.7% 
Two-Tier -1.9% -2.8% 
Uniform -1.9% -2.8% 
Combination -1.9% -2.8% 
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Global Consequences 
Table ES5: Effect of 10% Devaluation on Egypt’s Economy  
(Percentages)       
  Unit of  M u l t i p l i e r (%)
  Account I m p a c t T o t a l
Balance of Payments   
  Goods: Exports f.o.b. Nominal US$ 6.7% 7.0%
  Goods: Imports f.o.b. Nominal US$ -2.8% 4.1%
  Services: Credit Nominal US$ 1.2% 2.7%
  Services: Debit Nominal US$ -2.5% 3.1%
  Direct Investment in Egypt Nominal US$ -7.9% -8.5%
National Income Accounts   
Exports of Goods and NFS Constant LE 1.6% 3.6%
Imports of Goods and NFS Constant LE -2.7% 3.9%
Total Investment Constant LE -0.7% 2.8%
Total Consumption Constant LE 1.9% 3.2%
Government Consumption Constant LE 0.0% 2.9%
Private Consumption Constant LE 2.2% 3.3%
Gross Domestic Product Constant LE 1.7% 3.1%
Government Revenue and Expenditures    
Total Revenue  Constant LE -0.5% 2.7%
Tax Revenue Constant LE -0.7% 3.4%
Tax on trade Constant LE -2.8% 4.1%
Others Constant LE -0.2% 3.2%
Total Expenditures Constant LE 0.0% 2.1%
Current Expenditure Constant LE 0.0% 2.9%
Wages Constant LE -0.2% 3.2%
Other expenditures Constant LE 0.1% 2.7%
 Source: Annex IV of present study.       
 
 
The rapid expansion of global production and markets in the last two decades has given 
rise to systemic changes in the world economy. For Egypt, however, these changes have 
not generated a proportional expansion of international transactions and capital flows, nor 
have they created the widespread diffusion of technologies that has been evident in other 
developing countries. Its exports in the last decade have contracted by a yearly average of 
5.4 percent, compared with a 7 percent average annual growth of world trade. As a result, 
the country’s market share in the global economy is now half of what it was at the 
beginning of the 1990s. In large part, this lackluster performance is the result of Egypt’s 
trade policy. Out of the 26 countries examined, no country exhibited a higher number of 
NTBs than Egypt and, as mentioned earlier, Egypt has one of the highest average tariff 
rates in the world.  
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Table ES6:  Projected Changes in Egyptian Exports by Sector 
(Annual percent change from 1997-2005) 
 Baseline 
Tariff and 
Tax Reform
Leather 21.6 42.8 
Fabricated Metals 16.9 36.7 
Other Machinery 15.7 32.3 
Other Manufactures 15.5 30.0 
Garments 4.6 15.1 
Wood Products 6.9 14.1 
Other Services 7.7 11.4 
Electrical Machinery 5.3 10.5 
Chemicals 2.6 5.1 
Construction 2.7 4.6 
Refining 3.7 4.3 
Food 4.2 4.0 
Other Utilities 3.0 2.8 
Petroleum 1.9 2.0 
Trans Comm 1.5 1.0 
TFI 1.3 0.6 
Paper Pub 0.0 -0.6 
Crops 2.3 -0.7 
Beverages and Tobacco -0.4 -2.3 
Livestock 0.1 -2.9 
Textiles -2.7 -3.7 
Electrical Utilities -3.0 -3.8 
Minerals -3.7 -5.4 
Mining -7.0 -7.2 
Transport Equipment -7.8 -8.8 
Basic Metals -9.3 -11.3 
 
To evaluate the prospect of globalization on Egypt under its present trade regime and the 
possible effects of alternative liberalization strategies on its world market position, Annex 
V used a global general equilibrium model to compare the Egyptian economy in a 
projected 2005 baseline to an alternative projected 2005 scenario under the alternative 
liberalization strategy. The reform strategy examined with this model reflects a different 
version of those undertaken elsewhere in this study. It involves complete elimination of 
tariffs and the application of a single GST to domestic production and imports.  
 
This alternative scenario involves a total indirect tax that leaves GOE revenue 
unchanged. The 25 percent GST that emerges from the results differs from that used 
elsewhere in this study for two reasons: the present analysis starts from a different base 
year, and it includes indirect tax interactions through input-output linkages and factor 
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market linkages between sectors. The results of this strategy are dramatic at the sector 
and industry levels (see Table ES6). Those exports most likely to benefit are leather, 
fabricated metals, garments, wood and electrical machinery, while large contractions are 
expected in exports of basic metals, transport equipment, mining, minerals and textiles.  
 
Strategy Design and Implementation 
 
The analysis in this study of Egypt’s present tariff regime and alternative reform 
strategies suggest an agenda for tariff reform in Egypt that would contain the following 
elements: 
 
? Reduce the overall tariff level from the present 20 percent to a rate more 
competitive with other countries and make tariffs the only instrument of 
protection.  
? Eliminate import surcharges and similar para-tariffs replacing them with 
consumption or excise taxes that do not discriminate between foreign and 
domestic goods. 
? Eliminate nominal tariff dispersion by moving to fewer rates in stages that would 
lead to a uniform tariff. 
? Eliminate nominal tariff escalation by not having different rates geared to the 
particular stage of processing.  
? Make access to foreign inputs through the duty drawback and temporary 
admission system automatic and eliminate undue delays in receiving drawbacks 
and exemptions from duties and taxes paid on inputs.  
? Make tariff changes more transparent and predictable and undertaken by an 
independent group that is not beholden to any particular group or activity.  
? Make the exchange rate system more responsive to changes in domestic and 
international prices by moving toward a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
To ensure a smooth transition to the liberalization of tariffs, the findings of present study 
lead to the following recommendations for the design and implementation of a specific 
program in Egypt. First, it is important to aim toward the objectives of the ideal regime. 
These are to reduce tariffs, their dispersion and their escalation, and to move toward a 
uniform rate.  
 
Second, for strategic reasons and to avoid short-term spikes in import protection, a 
combination of strategies may be warranted during the transition period. The exact 
sequence should depend on the present tariff structure and the expected changes in 
imports, tax revenue and key macroeconomic and sector indicators resulting from the 
tariff reductions. The present study found that a two-tier tariff structure followed by a 
uniform tariff provided a useful way to sequence the reform process. 
 
Third, there are many tariffs that are redundant in the sense that their reduction would 
have no impact on resource allocation. These could be reduced without a problem. So 
could the remaining administrative barriers to imports.  
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Fourth, the sequence followed must be clearly defined both in terms of the different tariff 
rates that would be targeted and the time period. Thus one could announce, for example, 
a plan to reduce tariffs by a two-tier method in the first two years followed by another 
well-defined stage for the next two years leading to a uniform tariff in the fifth year.  
 
Finally, other policies need to complement import liberalization, especially as they relate 
to macroeconomic policies, exchange rate policies and the regulatory environment. Each 
of these policy areas plays a crucial role in tariff reduction. In the macroeconomic area, 
monetary and fiscal policies needed to achieve and maintain price stability are an 
essential ingredient of liberalization. The exchange rate regime needs to be consistent 
with import liberalization policies since an exchange rate that is out of equilibrium, such 
as an appreciated currency, distorts incentives toward producing for the domestic market 
and subsidizes imports when tariffs are reduced. Finally, without an efficient regulatory 
regime, the resource shift from import liberalization would be undermined by investment 
and labor market regulations. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on the guidelines for examining alternative tariff liberalization strategies, the study 
team concluded the following: 
 
Revenue neutrality –The fiscal revenue impact of a trade reform program is unlikely to be 
severe if there are concurrent broad-based reforms. A program that reduces the average 
tariff rate, lowers tariff dispersions, limits exemptions, and moves towards a uniform rate 
could possibly lower tariff revenue in the short run, but it would also increase revenue in 
the medium term as trade liberalization spurs economic growth and generates a larger tax 
base in the economy. An accompanying currency devaluation would also expand 
imported values measured in domestic currency for purposes of valuation and help to 
increase tax revenue. Moreover, with lower rates and fewer tariff exemptions, collection 
rates would be likely to improve and lower the incidence of under invoicing and 
smuggling.  
 
Minimize employment disruptions - Adjustments in factor markets, especially that of 
labor, are also likely to be small. Given the estimated annual labor turnover rates of 8.5 
percent, labor displacement would probably be small even if the reform package were 
implemented over a relatively short period of time. For capital movements, adjustments 
in foreign investment will tend to follow the reduction in the number of protected sectors. 
Since there is strong evidence that trade reforms and macroeconomic stability have a 
much more positive impact on FDI inflows than protected industries, customs duty 
exemptions, and tax holidays for foreign investors, Egypt’s favorable macroeconomic 
climate and proposed trade policy reforms should stimulate foreign investment inflows 
into the country’s industries having true comparative advantages. 
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Complementary policies – The industry-level effect of any tariff reform package 
necessarily depends on the economic constraints to adjustments. For Egypt, tariff reform 
would be greatly constrained by the overvalued exchange rate and the regulatory 
environment, especially those that represent NTBs to trade. Without a significant 
liberalization of the exchange market, it would be difficult to reverse the current account 
imbalance and attract foreign investment that relied in any way on foreign inputs. The 
fact that Egypt already enjoys macroeconomic stability would greatly benefit the 
transition of important industries to a new tariff regime and help to ensure a predicable 
situation during the transition.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This document is the final report of the Economic Analysis of Tariff Reform in Egypt 
study. As the main report it presents the summary and recommendations of a consulting 
team of the Development Economic Policy Reform Analysis (DEPRA) project on the 
technical viability and strategy to implement tariff liberalization measures in Egypt. It 
aims to bring together the main points and conclusions of the five Annexes in Volume II, 
containing the technical material for the major components of the study.  
 
The study has been undertaken on behalf of the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade 
and the Ministry of Finance. The guidelines for examining alternative tariff liberalization 
strategies that were communicated to the study team have been that (a) tariff reforms 
should be as revenue-neutral as possible, (b) the reforms should cause as few disruptions 
to employment as possible, and (c) the reforms should have a minimal effect on Egypt’s 
important industries. 
 
The overall purpose of this study is to provide the Ministry of Economy and Foreign 
Trade and the Ministry of Finance with advice on how to proceed with tariff reform in a 
manner that is economically and technically viable, supportive of the Government’s 
overall reform program and responsive to private sector needs. The study aims to develop 
an action plan for implementing a new round of tariff reform that addresses the fiscal 
revenue, industrial production and labor adjustment issues of the Egyptian economy. The 
emphasis is on a practical, action-oriented plan, rather than an academic study. 
 
1.2 Study Coverage 
 
The analytical portion of this study (Volume II) begins by examining the deficiencies in 
the present trade regime and the specific reform agenda that would address those 
deficiencies. It then proceeds to quantify the economic effects of the proposed areas of 
reform. Following a review of the current tariff structure, the empirical analysis describes 
the different effects of trade policy changes from both partial equilibrium and 
macroeconomic perspectives. As a first step in the estimation process, the partial 
equilibrium analysis focuses on the direct trade effects of tariff changes at a very low 
level of product detail. In the second step, the analysis is extended to a macroeconomic 
framework that allows us to estimate the transmission of those trade effects to the 
economy, and the feedback effects that occur in the external sector from income and 
price changes. Since both types of analyses focus on the demand-side of the economy, the 
results allow us to examine the difference between estimates of the direct effects of tariff 
reforms and those arising from both direct and indirect changes in the macroeconomy.  
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The results of the national-level detailed product analysis are used in the next part of the 
study to evaluate the impact of alternative reform strategies on industries. At the industry 
level there is significant heterogeneity across sectors in terms of tariff protection, industry 
characteristics, and possible impediments to structural adjustment. By focusing on a low 
level of industry detail, we can obtain useful measures of effective rates of protection 
(ERPs). The ERP measures of the extent of industry protection and the direction of the 
value-added price change for any given tariff reform are based on existing input/output 
(IO) data and a firm-level survey to parameterize the IO coefficients. The calculated 
output changes can then be related to required changes in labor and capital by using data 
on labor- and capital-output by industry in DEPRA’s database.  
 
As part of the industry-specific analysis for trade liberalization under various tariff 
reform scenarios, the study analyzes factor-specific adjustment magnitudes and 
adjustment experiences. The apparent heterogeneity of Egyptian industries suggests the 
outcome of significantly different adjustment experiences in response to tariff reform. 
The labor adjustment analysis identifies industry characteristics that are conducive to 
smooth adjustment and highlights potential impediments. Key features of industries 
relevant to the adjustment experience include labor and capital “turnover rates,” which 
were obtained from an industry survey, and other economic characteristics associated 
with the degree of adjustment frictions. 
 
The revenue implications of tariff reforms are considered in a macroeconomic model. 
Since exchange rate adjustments often accompany trade policy reforms, we also consider 
exchange rate adjustments that could be revenue-enhancing by removing or reducing 
currency over-valuation. If trade balances initially worsen with tariff reductions, a 
devaluation could forestall the need for offsetting adjustments to fiscal and monetary 
policy. In general, however, the effect of a fall in the value of the currency on trade tax 
revenue is ambiguous and therefore needs to be empirically tested.  
 
Our results indicate that trade liberalization is indeed linked to higher rates of economic 
growth, since the reduction in protection leads both to greater investment and a higher 
rate of output growth in the long run. The enhanced growth, in turn, leads to an expansion 
of the tax base and a concomitant expansion of revenue potential. To the extent that 
trade-liberalizing growth is associated with an increased importance of trade, the ratio of 
trade taxes to GDP tends to increase for a given level of tariffs. The specific outcome of 
trade liberalization, however, depends on the precise components of the reform package, 
and the study examines five commonly adopted strategies. The findings also support the 
need for the adoption of a more comprehensive public finance perspective on policy 
reform covering tax and exchange rate reforms. 
 
The study then invokes an economy-wide model to determine likely trade and real 
income shifts in Egypt’s participation in the globalization process (as it refers to the 
intensification of international trade, cross-border production, and finance linkages). The 
results of this part of the study provide useful insights into the likely economy-wide 
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adjustment magnitudes and adjustment experience under various tariff-reform scenarios, 
and how Egypt would fare in the globalization process if it were to undertake the 
proposed reforms. By way of contrast, the model also estimates the costs associated with 
continuing under the GOE’s present program. 
 
Finally, the study lays out the main elements needed for the design and implementation 
of the proposed tariff reform package. Although the optimum path for liberalizing trade is 
one that maximizes net social benefits, consideration is also given to individual effects of 
the reform measures. Since alternative tariff reform strategies may require 
complementary reform measures to offset undesirable macroeconomic or sector-specific 
effects, we consider a compensating devaluation to ensure a neutral tax revenue effect 
and bolster Egypt’s international competitiveness in the context of timing and sequencing 
issues of trade liberalization.  
 
1.3 Report Structure 
 
The study was carried out during the period between January and September 2000 under 
the direction of Dr. James Walker, DEPRA Trade liberalization Advisor, Dr. John 
Suomela, DEPRA Senior Trade Policy Advisor and Dr. Hafiz Shaltout, USAID/COTR. 
The authors of the volumes that make up the present report are as follows: 
 
• Volume 1 – Main Report: Dr. Montague Lord, team leader. 
 
• Volume 2  
o Annex I – Design Options and Sequencing: Mr. Sarath Rajapatirana, 
international consultant. 
 
o Annex II – Direct and Macroeconomic Consequences: Ms. Greta Boye, 
international consultant. 
 
o Annex III – Industry-Level Analysis: Dr. James Cassing, international 
consultant, with the collaboration of Dr. Fatma El Hamidi, international 
consultant, and the following local consultants:  Dr. Alia El Mahdi, Dr. 
Iman Mohamed Ahmed, Dr. Omar Salman and Ms. Nabila Al Iskandarani. 
 
o Annex IV – Fiscal Revenue Implications: Dr. Montague Lord, team 
leader. 
 
o Annex V – Global Consequences: Dr. Joseph Francois, international 
consultant. 
 
All team members benefited greatly from extensive data and economic information 
provided by Dr. Suzanne Messiha and the Comp Team of DEPRA. 
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Following this background introductory chapter, the remainder of the Main Report is 
organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 – Examines Egypt’s tariff structure, the magnitude of existing protection, 
and possible liberalization strategies. 
 
Chapter 3 – Quantifies and compares differences between the direct trade and 
macroeconomic effects of tariff reforms and the likely adjustment 
magnitudes under various tariff reform strategies. 
 
Chapter 4 – Provides an industry-level analysis of the direction and magnitude of 
adjustment associated with tariff reforms, and identifies industry 
characteristics that are fairly amenable to adjustment. 
 
Chapter 5 – Examines the fiscal revenue implications of trade liberalization in the 
context of a macroeconomic model with complementary tax and exchange 
rate reforms. 
 
Chapter 6 – Reviews Egypt’s performance in the globalization process as it refers to 
the intensification of international trade, cross-border production, and 
finance linkages underpinned by economic liberalization and 
technological change. 
 
Chapter 7 – Lays out the strategy for designing and implementing tariff reforms in 
terms of the underlying principles for such a reform, the cost of non-
adjustment, social net benefits versus private costs, the options for 
liberalizing trade, complementary measures, and the sequencing and 
timing of those reforms. 
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2.0 Tariff Levels and Reform Strategies 
 
 
2.1 Existing Tariff Structure 
 
Egypt has implemented six major reforms to its 
tariff structure since the introduction of the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP) in 1991 (see Box 2.1). Tariff 
reductions have generally followed the so-called 
concertina method, whereby the highest rates are 
lowered to the next highest level. However, tariffs 
below 30 percent have not been adjusted 
downward since 1994 and the most recent set of 
reductions reflect an apparent shift away from a 
strategy of overall tariff reductions, which often 
accompanies the startup of economic reforms, 
towards one based on a targeted sector-based 
reduction system.  
 
Despite its continued reliance on trade taxes for 
much of its tax revenue, the GOE has made a 
number of commitments to accelerate tariff 
reductions under the WTO and various regional 
trade agreements. Yet the tariff structure 
continues to largely reflect a protectionist strategy 
based on a high average tariff, the wide dispersion of tariffs across multiple bands, tariff 
escalation, tariff peaks, an anti-export bias, and a high proportion of tariff lines (over 12 
percent) that are in sensitive sectors with rates exceeding WTO tariff bindings.  
Box 2.1
Egypt’s Tariff Reform History 
 
Date Action Taken 
1991 Tariff range lowered from 0.7 to 
120 percent to 5 to 100 percent. 
 
1993 Tariff range lowered to between 5 and 
80 percent. 
 
1994 General maximum tariff rate lowed to 
70 percent; tariffs between 30 and 70 
percent reduced by 10 points; 
Harmonized System (HS) of 
classification adopted. 
 
1996 Tariff rates lowered by 10 to 15 
percentage points, and general 
maximum tariff rate lowered to 55 
percent.  
 
1997 Tariff rates above 30 percent lowered 
by 5 percentage points, and general 
maximum rate lowered to 50 percent. 
 
1998 Most tariff rates lowered by 5 to 10 
percentage points, and general 
maximum rate lowered to 40 percent.  
 
Overall, the trade-weighted average tariff is 20 
percent (based on a calendar-year average of 
the CIF (cost, insurance and freight) value of 
imports reported in the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics 
(IMF-IFS).2 3 That rate is higher than in any 
Table 2.1: Trade-Weighted Average  
Tariffs of Egypt, 1995/96-1998/99 
1995/96 18.8% 
1996/97 18.3% 
1997/98 17.9% 
1998/99 20.2% 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics.  
                                                 
2 When the same calculation is made for the same time period using fiscal-year CIF import value data from 
the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and another IMF data source (IMF, 1998), the average tariff rate is 
somewhat higher at 24 percent. However, the latter calculations yield average tariff rates that vary 
considerably from year-to-year, particularly in the last year for which data are available, and that appear 
less in line with recent tariff reforms than those averages based on IMF-IFS import value data. The lack of 
consistent data sources explains the considerable disparity in the average tariff calculations reported in 
other studies. Havrylyshyn (1996), as reported in Handy (1998), reports an average tariff of 28 percent in 
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Table 2.2: Trade-Weighted 
Average Tariff, 1997/98 
Average tariff
India      29.5  
Tunisia      23.5  
Zimbabwe      20.5  
Sri Lanka      19.8  
Brazil      18.3  
Egypt      17.9  
Indonesia      14.9  
Poland      14.2  
Argentina      14.1  
Peru      12.5  
Mexico      12.0  
Chile      10.9  
Venezuela      10.9  
Uruguay      10.7  
Colombia      10.5  
Hungary         9.4  
Malaysia         9.4  
Philippines         9.1  
Korea         7.8  
Turkey         5.7  
Australia         4.4  
New Zealand         4.0  
El Salvador         3.8  
European Union         3.5  
Sweden         3.5  
Canada         3.2  
United States         2.7  
Norway         2.4  
Japan         1.5  
Source: Volume 6 of present study, 
based on World Bank, World 
Development Indicators,1999; and 
Table 2.1 for Egypt’s tariff. 
 
earlier year since the mid-1990s. By way of contrast, 
out of a sample of 26 countries, those having a higher 
tariff than that of Egypt are India, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, 
Sri Lanka and Brazil. Argentina has an average tariff 
of 14 percent, Bolivia 6 percent, Chile 11 percent, 
Malaysia 9 percent and Sri Lanka 13 percent. With 
the more recent and higher 1998/99 tariff rate, Egypt 
would rank fourth among the 26 countries. 
 
A second feature of Egypt’s tariff structure is the 
wide dispersion of tariffs, which vary from 0 to 3000 
percent. The standard deviation of Egypt’s tariff 
structure is 128 percentage points and the associated 
coefficient of variation is 4.5, indicating a wide 
dispersion. This range of tariffs is also much larger 
than that of many of the trade reforming countries of 
the 1990s, for instance, in Argentina, where the 
simple tariff range is 0-40; in Bolivia, where it is 0-
10; in Chile, where it is 0 with a uniform tariff, and in 
Sri Lanka, where it is 0-50. At the same time, the 
number of tariff bands has also increased dramatically 
since 1994. Although there are currently 21 bands in 
the tariff schedule, only a few bands generate most of 
the revenue. Using data for 1998, we calculated that 
90 percent of Egypt’s revenue was generated from 
imports with five different applied tariff rates (5, 10, 
20, 30 and 40 percent), while only 8 percent of 
revenue was generated from imports with three 
applied tariff rates (15, 54 and 45 percent), and 2 
percent of revenue was generated from imports taxed 
at the remaining 13 rates. 
 
A third feature of Egypt’s tariff structure is the high 
escalation in its tariffs. Escalation occurs when the 
tariff rate increases with the stage of processing of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
1996, while our calculations using IMF-IFS data yield an average of 18.5 percent for that year. Kheir-El-
Din (1998) reports an average of 16.7 percent in 1995, which is close to our calculated average of 18.8 
percent for 1995/96 using IMF-IFS data. For a detailed comparison of tariff averages, see Volume 3 of this 
study. 
 
3 There is even greater disparity between our calculations of the ratio of tariff revenue to import value and 
our calculations of the statutory ad valorem tariff rates weighted by corresponding import values. For 1998 
the average statutory (official) rate is only 13.3 percent, compared with the average collected rate of 17.9 in 
1997/98 and 20.2 in 1998/99. These large differences between collected rates and official rates have been 
reported by Pritchett and Sethi (1994) for other developing countries, and are usually attributed to under-
invoicing, valuation errors, and tariffs exemptions. 
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product. Raw materials carry no or low protection, while intermediate goods carry higher 
rates, and final goods carry the highest rates. In such cases the rate of protection is 
progressively raised and escalated. In Egypt, final goods are more than twice as protected 
as the raw materials, and tariff escalation is found to be most significant in textiles, 
leather, wood and wooden furniture.  
 
A fourth feature of the Egypt’s tariff structure is that there are many barriers that act as 
tariffs beyond the posted and applied tariff rates. These are NTBs that include 
cumbersome customs procedures that involve the clearing of goods and the 
administration of quality standards. One of the main problems with the latter is that no 
one agency is in charge and there are different standards relating to health, safety and 
phyto-sanitary standards. There are 
conflicting standards and inevitable 
queuing problems at the entry points of 
imports. The cumulative effect of different 
standards is that of a non-tariff barrier that 
can be expressed as a tariff equivalent. 
The delays in clearance entail demurrage 
costs and finance charges for the 
importers. More recently new measures 
have been introduced that also increase the 
protective effects of tariffs and tariff-like measures. The upshot of all these measures is to 
provide a measure of protection for Egyptian domestic industries that reduces 
competitiveness and creates inefficiencies. This is one reason Egypt has not been able to 
maintain its share in world trade despite the trade liberalization progressively undertaken 
since the early 1990s. 
Box 2.2: Egypt’s Tariff Structure 
 
? Current version since November 1998 
? Number of tariff lines: 6,062 
? Number of tariff lines with imports: 5,382 
? Number of official rates: 21 
? Unweighted average: 22% 
? Weighted average: 20.2%  
? Maximum tariff: 3,000% 
? Minimum tariff: 0% 
? Standard deviation: 128
 
2.2 Fiscal Revenue and Trade Taxes 
 
The efficiency gains from further trade liberalization have to be weighed against the 
Government’s strategy for achieving internal balance, largely through fiscal austerity and 
the maintenance of fiscal revenues. The successful reduction in the fiscal deficit from 20 
percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 1990/91 to around 1 percent 
in 1998/99 reflected both revenue 
increases and expenditure cutbacks. 
With fiscal austerity, inflation 
decelerated from around 20 percent in 
the 1980s to 7 percent by 1996, 
eventually averaging 4 percent after 
1997. The Government has also used 
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor 
and strict monetary and credit controls 
in its disinflation strategy. During this 
period of stabilization, the Egyptian pound has moved in a narrow range vis-à-vis the 
0
5
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Figure 2.1
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (%)
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dollar and any upward or downward pressure on the exchange rate has been absorbed 
through passive intervention. 
 
While total tax revenue since the start of the reforms has remained fairly stable relative to 
GDP, non-tax revenue has contracted from 14 percent of GDP in 1990/91 to less than 9 
percent in 1998/99. Total tax revenue, and that of trade taxes in particular, has therefore 
had to support an increasingly larger portion of fiscal expenditures. Between 1991/92 and 
1998/99, the proportion of tax revenue from trade has risen from nearly 19 to over 21 
percent, and trade tax revenue as a proportion of 
total tax and non-tax revenue has risen from 11 to 
14 percent in the same period. The fiscal revenue 
implications of any tariff cuts are therefore 
especially important to the GOE.  
 
The Government also relies on customs 
surcharges for additional revenue from traded 
products. A customs service fee of one percent is 
applied to the value of all imported goods in 
return for inspection, listing, classification and re-
examination of shipments. Another surcharge of 2 
percent is levied on commodities whose customs 
duties are between 5 and 29 percent, and a surcharge of 3 percent is levied on 
commodities subject to duties of 30 percent or higher. In addition to tariffs and 
surcharges, imported goods are subject to a general sales tax (GST) upon clearance from 
customs. That tax is added to the duty-inclusive customs value of imported items, which 
results in a further tax hike: by applying the GST and customs surcharges to the duty-
inclusive import value, the Customs Authority adds on nearly 3 percentage points to the 
average tax that importers must pay over and above quoted duties applied to the shipment 
value of imports (exclusive of customs duties). 
Table 2.3: Contribution of Trade 
Taxes to Total Tax Revenue, 
1991/92-1998/99 
  
Tax on 
Trade 
Other 
Taxes 
1991/92 18.9% 81.1%
1992/93 18.3% 81.7%
1993/94 19.5% 80.5%
1994/95 20.5% 79.5%
1995/96 20.7% 79.3%
1996/97 20.1% 79.9%
1997/98 20.2% 79.8%
1998/99 21.4% 78.6%
 
2.3 Consequences of the Tariff Regime  
 
The relatively high level of protection, its large dispersion and high degree of escalation 
undermine the GOE’s medium-term economic growth targets. With the present tariff 
structure and the trade regime, it would be difficult to raise economic growth to 8 percent 
per year, exports to 10 percent per year and to lower the unemployment rate to close to 4 
percent. Continued application of the present tariff and trade regime would not permit 
Egypt to exploit its comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive 
manufactures, since the present tariff regime draws resources away from such activities. 
Moreover, existing trade distortions lead to investment in non-competitive activities. 
 
The large dispersion in tariffs interferes with the optimal allocation of resources since the 
relative returns to activities are not determined by comparative advantage, but rather by 
the differences in protection rates arising from the differential in tariffs. Generally, the 
activities that seek and receive protection are those industries that cannot compete well 
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with foreign imports or use their resources to compete in external markets. The activities 
that have received protection absorb resources inefficiently, thereby preventing them 
from being used for more competitive activities. The higher the dispersion of tariffs, the 
higher is the deviation of activities from their most efficient use. In this sense, high 
dispersion in tariffs is even more harmful than high protection in itself. If all industries 
are protected to the same extent, then resource flows will be neutral among sectors.  
 
The presence of high tariff escalation tends to discourage the growth of input-producing 
industries. This may be counterproductive to the best use of resources. Egypt may have a 
comparative advantage in input-producing activities such as cotton for textiles and 
minerals for light industries. When these activities are discriminated against by low 
tariffs, entrepreneurs will receive greater profits from the latter parts of the production 
chain, which may not have a comparative advantage. Industrial development in general 
has followed a pattern of movement from raw material and intermediate good production 
to the production of final goods. Egypt’s tariff escalation may encourage to this pattern 
and may in fact undermine efforts to industrialize.  
 
2.3 Tariff Reform Strategies 
 
The need to address Egypt’s tariff issues in terms of their high average, wide dispersion 
across multiple bands, high degree of escalation, and anti-export bias has become 
imperative. While Egypt has made considerable progress in reaching macroeconomic 
balance, undertaking reforms to privatize parts of the economy, and creating a more 
investment-friendly environment, it still lags behind in export performance compared 
with many other developing countries. Its output expansion has been mostly associated 
with the non-tradable sectors rather than the tradable sectors. In fact, Egypt is unique 
among countries in the middle-income category because its economic performance has 
not included increasing its market share in world exports. On the contrary, Egypt has lost 
its market share while the economy has performed well in terms of output, employment 
growth and in reaching macroeconomic balance. 
 
To date, trade policy reform in Egypt has focused on replacing certain quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) with tariffs, removing export taxes, eliminating some non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to trade, and lowering certain tariffs. The Government has informally 
indicated its desire to consider further liberalize trade by restructuring and reducing 
tariffs, although it has not yet revealed a strategy preference. Formally, the GOE has 
signaled its commitment to further liberalization measures through its obligations to the 
WTO and other donor-sponsored programs. Against this background, the guiding 
objectives communicated to the study team in examining alternative tariff liberalization 
strategies have been that tariff reforms should have the following characteristics:  
 
? Tariff reforms should be as revenue-neutral as possible  
? Tariff reforms should cause as few disruptions to employment as possible  
? Tariff reforms should have a minimal effect on Egypt’s important industries  
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To provide the GOE with the broadest set of alternatives in this study, we have examined 
the consequences of restructuring Egypt’s tariffs using the five most commonly applied 
reform strategies. Box 2.3 summarizes the major advantages and disadvantages of each of 
the five strategies, while the following paragraphs summarize each of the strategies: 
 
Free Trade. Although not an often-adopted option, this is a theoretically-ideal strategy 
and it serves as a benchmark for comparing the consequences of other strategies.  
 
Concertina Method. This strategy aims to gradually reduce individual tariffs from their 
highest level to their next lowest level. In many countries it is often used to move towards 
the implementation of a uniform tariff. In our analysis, the GOE would reduce existing 
tariffs above 30 percent to 30 percent, and raise the lowest rate to the next highest level 
not to exceed 10 percent, thereby compressing the tariff schedule while moving it 
towards a 10 percent rate.  
 
Two-Tier Method. This strategy represents a simple form of tariff escalation, which from 
an importer’s point of view promotes infant industries and those industries with export 
potential by allowing their inputs to be taxed at a lower rate than competing finished 
products. Our analysis has sought to achieve a revenue neutral effect from this new tariff 
structure. 
 
Uniform Tariff. In the present study, we examine the effects of a single tariff that is 
revenue neutral. Revenue neutrality in this case is estimated from the direct (partial 
equilibrium) effects of the tariff. It is also possible to adopt a revenue neutral strategy at 
the macroeconomic level that would account for the feedback effects from tariff reforms. 
Direct effects, however, are more readily calculated than those obtained from the 
macroeconomic model developed for the present study, and they were therefore used for 
designing specific tariff strategies.  
 
Combination of Two-Tier and Uniform Tariff Strategies. This combination affords 
domestic industries transitional protection while moving towards a uniform tariff. In 
years one through three, the two-tier approach would be applied, and in years four and 
five, a uniform tariff would be applied. Their final impact would be revenue neutral. 
 
In the following chapter, we examine each of these strategies both from a microeconomic 
perspective using partial equilibrium analysis and from a macroeconomic perspective. 
Details of the methodology used to assess these strategies are laid out in Volume II, 
Annexes II and IV, of the study. Regardless of the particular strategy adopted by GOE, 
we have emphasized the need for a simplified tariff structure that would permit importers 
to take full advantage of the improved market access conditions, and reduce the 
administrative burden for both the customs authority and the private sector. 
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Box 2.4: Alternative Strategies for Egypt’s Tariff Reform  
Scenario Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Concertina 
Method 
? Lower highest rates to next 
highest level with 30% being 
new maximum level, and raise 
lowest rate to next highest level 
not to exceed 10% 
? Tariff steps incremented by 5 
percentage points, resulting in 
6 bands (starting with 5% tariff) 
? Offers a 5-year transition 
period to full implementation 
? Would move the tariff structure 
towards a uniform tariff of 10% by 
compressing the tariff structure and 
restricting tariffs to a narrow band 
? Would eliminate tariff peaks and 
multiple bands 
? Would reduce dispersion 
? Would help to minimize directly 
unproductive activities designed to obtain 
high tariffs 
? Most imports already 
enter Egypt at rates of 
10% and 30% 
Two-Tier 
Approach 
? Apply single tariff to inputs 
and another single tariff to final 
products 
? Provides 5-percentage point 
spread between lower rate for 
inputs and higher rate for final 
products 
? Offers a 5-year transition 
period to full implementation 
? Combined tariffs produce a 
revenue neutral effect in year 5 
? Would simplify structure by reducing 
multiple tariff bands 
? Would improve transparency 
? Could lead to lower ERPs 
? Could reduce tax evasion thereby 
raising revenues 
? Could lower use of tariff exemptions 
? Possible difficulty in 
agreeing on products 
defined as inputs and final 
products 
? Maintains tariff 
escalation, resulting in 
likely high ERPs, although 
possibly slightly lower, 
than under the current 
structure 
Uniform 
Tariff 
? Apply single tariff to all 
imports 
? Offers a 5-year transition 
period to full implementation 
? Tariffs produce a revenue 
neutral effect in year 5 
? Would consolidate and simplify tariffs 
and eliminate dispersion 
? Would introduce transparency into 
system and reduce administrative 
burdens, and could also promote FDI 
? Could lead to lower tax evasion 
? Could reduce rent-seeking and 
possibly raise revenues 
? Would create a more balanced 
incentives environment 
? Could reduce use of tariff exemptions 
? Would enhance economic efficiency 
by equalizing protection across goods 
? Unless domestic taxes 
(e.g., general sales tax) 
are made uniform, 
marginal distortion costs of 
protection in production 
will not be equalized 
across industries 
Sequential 
Reform using 
Two-Tier, and 
Uniform 
Tariff 
Structures 
? Adopt narrow-ranged 
concertina method, followed by 
two-tier approach, and finally 
adopt uniform tariff in year 5. 
? Provides gradual move to uniform tariff 
? Offers clear foresight for adjustment 
by industries 
 
Indirect Tax 
Reforms  
? Eliminate import fees 
immediately 
? Implement uniform general 
sales tax (GST) that is applied 
to border (cif) price 
? GST applied uniformly to 
foreign and domestically 
produced goods 
? Provides for 5-year transition 
period 
? Uniform GST to be revenue 
neutral in year 5 
? Would reduce administrative burden 
and improve transparency 
? Could be revenue-enhancing due to 
reduced scope for duty evasion and 
elimination of exemptions 
? A uniform application on foreign and 
domestic goods is WTO-consistent 
? Application to border price would 
remove effect of tax magnification 
 
Notes: (a) In all cases the Government of Egypt should announce the strategy for tariff reform in advance and commit to that reform; 
(b) the scenario of free trade (zero tariffs) which in effect is another type of uniform tariff is also being examined for illustrative
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3.0 Direct and Macroeconomic Impact 
Effects 
 
 
 
3.1 Background 
 
Two types of models are used in this study to examine alternative tariff strategies for 
Egypt. The first, based on partial equilibrium analysis, provides detailed product 
information on the direct impact of trade liberalization. The second, based on a 
macroeconomic framework, captures the dynamic feedback effects between import 
adjustments and the macro-economy. These two approaches complement one another 
insofar as the first allows us to compare the direct effects of alternative strategies on the 
structure of imports, while the second lets us assess the effects of those alternative 
strategies on the national income and financial accounts, as well as the government 
budget. Measurement of these effects at the macroeconomic level is particularly 
important since past cost-of-protection studies that have relied on comparative static 
analysis have found the size of the estimates to be small.4  
 
The analysis begins within the partial-equilibrium framework to examine import demand 
adjustments at the detailed tariff-line level. Because of time-related adjustments and 
lagged responses, the analysis considers inter-temporal issues as they relate to the effects 
of alternate strategies on trade creation, trade diversion, balance of payments, government 
revenue and consumer welfare. The resulting import changes derived from the partial-
equilibrium analysis serve as inputs to the macroeconomic model. While not offering the 
same level of detail, estimates of the effects of trade liberalization in a macroeconomic 
framework incorporate dynamics and allow calculations of feedback effects between 
import adjustments and the macro-economy.5 As a consequence, the sizes of the 
estimates are likely to more accurately reflect adjustments to trade liberalization 
associated with broad-based reforms. From an analytical point of view, we use the 
Mundell-Fleming model of a small open economy to move from a partial equilibrium 
perspective to one that examines trade policy reforms in the context of Egypt’s 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Since trade liberalization often aggravates current account 
imbalances of countries, we also include in the analysis complementary exchange rate 
                                                 
4 Past estimates of the impact of trade liberalization have generally found that trade liberalization increases 
the welfare of a country by only about one-half to one percent of GDP (see, for example, Harrison, 
Rutherford and Tarr (1993; 1997) and Morkre and Tarr (1995)). 
5 By dynamics, we do not refer to models based on endogenous growth theory (Romer (1990) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991)), which are complex and necessarily focus on aggregate relationships (for a 
discussion of these models, see Tarr and Rutherford (1999)). In this study we instead rely on a tractable 
macroeconomic model for estimating the dynamic feedback effects between Egypt’s internal and external 
balances in response to trade liberalization and other economic reform measures that support that 
liberalization.  
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adjustments that could help to produce a sustainable balance of payments and move the 
Egyptian economy closer to overall equilibrium.  
 
3.2 Partial Equilibrium Impact Assessment 
 
The partial equilibrium approach to trade liberalization has been widely used for cost-of-
protection calculations of the direct effects on the value of imports of tariffs changes on 
individual product imports. For Egypt, the calculations are based on import demand 
relationships estimated for individual products at the detailed tariff line that build on the 
methodology used to estimate the foreign demand for selected products in Egypt from 
Nathan Associates (1999). Since observed import prices are based on the CIF value of 
imports and their corresponding volumes, tariff policy reforms for Egypt can easily be 
modeled by explicitly incorporating the tariff rate, and changes to that rate under different 
scenarios, into the price variable.6  
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the results for 
the partial equilibrium analysis in 
terms of the direct effects (see Box 3.1 
for a description of these effects). The 
effects for each of the five strategies 
are as follows: 
 
Free Trade. Under this scenario the 
value of trade would expand by 
US$976 million and US$42 million of 
trade based on preferences would shift 
to the multilateral trading system. The 
model was solved in such a way that 
Government revenue from trade and 
indirect taxes would remain 
unchanged. 
  
Concertina Method. In our simulation, 
the GOE would reduce existing tariffs 
above 30 percent to 30 percent, and 
raise the lowest rate to the next highest 
level not to exceed 10 percent, thereby 
compressing the tariff schedule while 
moving it towards a 10 percent rate. 
This approach would reduce the 
number of tariff bands from 21 to 6 
and would also reduce the trade-
weighted average for the products 
Box 3.1: Direct Effects of Partial Equilibrium 
Analysis 
 
Partial-equilibrium measures of trade liberalization 
estimate the production and consumption costs of tariff 
changes, as well as transfers that take place in the 
form of government revenue changes. The specific 
effects are as follows: 
 
? Trade creation effect equals the change in 
the level of domestic demand for imported 
inputs and final goods from trading partners 
resulting from tariff-associated foreign price 
reductions relative to domestically produced 
goods. 
 
? Trade diversion effect equals the substitution 
of imports between supplies originating from 
members of preferential trade arrangements 
and those originating from foreign suppliers 
subject to MFN rates.  
 
? Balance of payments effect equals the 
combined effects of the trade creation and 
trade diversion effects.  
 
? Government revenue effect equals the 
change in customs fees resulting from tariff 
cuts plus the change in indirect tax revenue 
resulting from the change in indirect taxes 
collected on imports, inclusive of customs 
duties.  
 
? Consumer welfare effect equals the tariff 
reduction gains that consumers obtain from 
lower prices on imported goods. 
                                                 
6 A spreadsheet-based model that accompanies the present study can be used to replicate the results of the 
study or develop other reform strategies. 
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selected for this 
analysis from 18 
percent to 13 
percent. For those 
products, the 
concertina strategy 
would result in a 
US$172 million 
increase in imports 
at the end of the 
fifth year of 
implementation. 
About $10 million 
of preferential trade would shift to the multilateral trading system. Applying a 21.5 
percent GST on imports would bring about the neutral government revenue effect. 
Table 3.1: Direct Effects of Tariff Reform at Year 5 
(US$ millions and % change from base scenario) 
  Trade Trade Balance of Total  
Strategy  Creation Diversion Payments Revenue 
$ 976 -42 -934 0 Free Trade % 14.0 -0.6 -13.3 0 
$ 172 -10 -161 0 Concertina % 4.5 -0.1 -2.3 0 
$ 145 -7 -137 0 Two-Tier % 2.1 -0.1 -2.0 0 
$ 158 -8 -149 0 Uniform % 2.3 -0.1 -2.1 0 
$ 22 0.04 22 0 Combination % 0.3 0.0 -0.3 0 
Source: Volume 3 of present report. 
 
Two-Tier Method. The model was solved for a tariff to be applied to inputs of 14 percent 
and a 19 percent tariff for final products that would have a revenue-neutral effect. The 
results of such a differential reduction would expand imports of the goods included in our 
sample by US$145 million. The value of imports originating from non-preferential 
suppliers would also decline by US$7 million, resulting in a negative effect on the 
balance of payments. A GST rate of 18.8 percent would result in a neutral government 
revenue effect. 
 
Uniform Tariff. A 15.2 percent uniform tariff would generate a revenue-neutral effect. 
The application of that single tariff rate, which represents an average 15 percent tariff cut 
applied to all products included in our sample, would lead to a US$158 million gain in 
the value of trade, and result in a contraction of imports from preferential suppliers of 
US$8 million. The overall effect on the balance of payments would be negative. The 
government revenue effect would be neutral with a GST rate of 18.8 percent, which is the 
same as the GST rate for the two-tier method because of the similarity in their trade-
weighted average tariff rates. 
 
Combination of Two-Tier and Uniform Tariff Strategies. The results for the combination 
of a two-tier tariff structure in the first three years and a uniform tariff in the fourth and 
fifth years indicate that the total value of imports included in our sample would increase 
by US$22 million, and that there would be a slight expansion of US$0.04 million in 
imports from preferential suppliers. The overall balance of payments effect would be 
negative, and the government revenue effect would be neutral with the application of an 
18.8 percent GST. 
 
3.3 Macroeconomic Impact Assessment 
 
The macroeconomic model for Egypt designed for this study is of an open economy that 
includes the determination of the trade and capital accounts of the balance of payments 
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(see Volume II, Annex IV, for a full description of the model). The modeling procedure 
has sought to account for the structure of the Egyptian economy, the availability of data, 
and the degree of stability of time-series estimates of parameters during the country's 
transition process. The resulting model allows for considerable flexibility in the selection 
of the policy mix and instruments for the targets of a program, and it offers a means of 
quantitatively evaluating the impact of trade liberalization and other economic policy 
reforms on the country, and assessing the feedback effects that changes in key 
macroeconomic variables produce in other sectors. The nature of the model therefore 
makes it tractable from an operational point of view. 
 
To arrive at the overall and sector-specific levels of economic activity, the model derives 
solutions for four major blocks: the national income accounts block, the public sector 
block, the financial sector block, and the balance of payments block. The balance of 
payments block generates information about the major balance of payments components, 
and it yields a solution to the balance of goods and non-factor services, which is then 
used in the national income accounts block. The national income accounts block contains 
a considerable amount of interrelationships between the endogenous variables in the 
system in order to capture feedback effects in the economy, including those in the public 
sector block. The financial sector block helps to determine the real and nominal variables 
in the economy.  
 
In general, the results for the five trade liberalization strategies are consistent with 
expectations about the effects of trade liberalization on the Egyptian economy (see Table 
3.2). The magnitude of the influence of trade policy reform on fiscal revenue, real 
economic activity (GDP, consumption, investment, imports and exports) and price-
related variables (interest rates and the prices) are calculated through multiplier analysis. 
The first-period effect is the impact multiplier; the interim multiplier measures the effect 
after 5 years, when full implementation of the new tariff structure takes place, and the 
cumulative multiplier is measured at year 20, a period of time that is sufficient for all 
dynamic adjustments to the new tariff structure to occur. In all cases, tariff cuts have an 
immediate impact on the overall import value, fiscal revenue and investment activity. The 
interim response after 5 years is about two-thirds that of the total long-run response, 
suggesting a fairly quick adjustment to the tariff changes.  
 
All strategies generally impact the Egyptian economy in somewhat similar manners 
because the average tariffs are quite similar. A lower overall tariff rate stimulates gross 
capital formation through domestic investment, which in turn stimulates overall growth 
of the economy. The increased national income further stimulates private consumption, 
while current expenditures of the Government contract in response to the lower trade tax 
revenue. The GOE nevertheless receives some compensation for the reduced trade tax 
revenue from increased tax revenue from other sources as a result of the private sector’s 
expanded economic activity.  
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Table 3.2 
Multiplier Analysis of Alternative Tariff Structures on Key Macroeconomic Variables
(Percent change and US dollars) 
Multiplier (%) 
Impact Interim Total 
  Unit of Account (1 year) (5 yrs) (20 years) 
Imports of goods       
Free Trade Nominal US$ 1.6% 5.1% 6.6%
Concertina Nominal US$ 0.2% 0.4% 0.6%
Two-Tier Nominal US$ 0.2% 0.5% 0.9%
Uniform Nominal US$ 0.2% 0.6% 0.6%
Combination Nominal US$ 0.3% 0.6% 0.9%
Imports of goods and nfs    
Free Trade Constant LE 1.1% 3.2% 4.2%
Concertina Constant LE 0.2% 0.4% 0.5%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.2% 0.4% 0.7%
Uniform Constant LE 0.2% 0.4% 0.7%
Combination Constant LE 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%
Trade tax revenue    
Free Trade Constant LE -30.8% -65.7% -93.6%
Concertina Constant LE -16.0% -19.2% -21.4%
Two-Tier Constant LE -8.0% -17.8% -25.2%
Uniform Constant LE -8.0% -17.8% -25.2%
Combination Constant LE -7.9% -17.7% -25.2%
Other tax revenue    
Free Trade Constant LE 0.1% 0.0% -1.5%
Concertina Constant LE 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Uniform Constant LE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Combination Constant LE 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Gross capital formation    
Free Trade Constant LE 1.7% 4.3% 6.8%
Concertina Constant LE 0.7% 1.4% 1.8%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.4% 1.2% 2.0%
Uniform Constant LE 0.4% 1.2% 2.0%
Combination Constant LE 0.4% 1.1% 2.1%
Real GDP     
Free Trade Constant LE 0.1% -0.4% -1.8%
Concertina Constant LE 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%
Two-Tier Constant LE 0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
Uniform Constant LE 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Combination Constant LE 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
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3.4 Partial Equilibrium and Macroeconomic Impact Comparison 
 
Partial equilibrium analysis provides greater product coverage detail and therefore greater 
reliability in identifying the direct effects of trade liberalization than does the 
macroeconomic analysis. The macroeconomic analysis, however, captures the interaction 
between changes in trade and real economic activity and its consumption, investment, 
imports and exports components, as well as price-related variables, and therefore offers a 
better perspective of the open economy adjustment process to trade liberalization. In 
general, the difference between the results of the two approaches arises from the 
transmission of trade adjustments to the open Egyptian economy and the feedback effects 
that these adjustments in the national income components have on trade.  
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4.0 Industry-Level Adjustments 
 
 
 
4.1 Background 
 
Disaggregation at the industry level reveals significant heterogeneity across sectors in 
terms of tariff protection and industry characteristics that include potential impediments 
to structural adjustments. The potential magnitude and direction of adjustments across 
these sectors depend on the numerous channels through which relative price changes can 
impact Egypt’s industries. Trade liberalization changes prices of traded goods relative to 
each other. It also changes the price of factors of production, and the relative prices of 
non-traded goods by changing prices of intermediate inputs. Liberalization also changes 
real output through increased opportunities for export earnings and price reductions. 
These price changes in turn influence the production, consumption, and investment 
decisions of individual firms in each industry in different ways, and these differences are 
likely to be especially great among large-scale enterprises, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).  
 
These effects suggest the following analytical strategy for measuring Egypt’s industry-
level response to trade liberalization: identify the set of industries and their input and 
final product prices that most influences their output decisions, estimate the price and 
output effects of trade liberalization, and use these estimates to determine the adjustments 
induced by trade liberalization. The industry-level coverage of this study is based on 
industry size, trade exposure, and an attempt to cover a range of processing activities 
from basic manufacturing and agriculture to skilled and technology intensive activities 
that reflect the range of production activities in which Egypt has either a ‘revealed’ or 
potential comparative advantage. The analysis focused on 46 industries, about half of 
which are industrial manufacturing and the remaining half are agricultural based. The 
selection of these industries was naturally based on data availability and it excluded 
Egypt’s minerals and petroleum based industries, since these are unlikely to be directly 
affected by any tariff reform.  
 
In estimating the likely effect of tariff reforms on input and final product prices, we 
calculated more disaggregated estimates of ERPs than have been previously available.7 
The impact of the five alternative reform strategies discussed in Chapter 2 are then 
                                                 
7 The effective rate of protection (ERP) measures how tariffs on a product and its tradable inputs jointly 
affect the value-added of a particular activity. When only the nominal rate of protection (NRP) is 
calculated, the imposition of a tariff on an imported good suggests that domestic producers of that product 
will be encouraged to increase their output. However, whether they increase output depends not only on the 
tariff on the import, but on the tariffs applied to inputs used in their production processes. While domestic 
producers are given an implicit subsidy on their production when there are tariffs on competing imports, 
they also face a tax on their imported inputs, which can neutralize the effect of the implicit subsidy. The 
ERP therefore measures the net protection on the production processes, rather than simply the gross 
protection on an industry’s output. 
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estimated by recalculating the ERPs under the variety of alternative tariff reforms. We 
then estimate supply elasticities for the industries and use the results to quantify the 
magnitude of the required tariff-induced output adjustment for each tariff scenario and for 
the benchmark of free trade. The adjustment related issues that are considered are those 
that are particularly important for Egypt, namely those related to labor and foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  
 
4.2 Effective Rates of Protection 
 
Overall, the mean average ERP for the 46 industries included in our sample is 65 percent, 
a rate that is substantially higher than the already high average NRP of 25 percent (see 
Table 4.1). Agriculture-related industries have the highest mean average ERP (93 
percent) of the three sectors, compared with its average NRP of 25 percent. Public and 
private industrial activities have very similar average ERPs of just overage 50 percent, 
compared with equally similar NRPs of around 25 percent. These results suggest that 
disaggregated estimates for individual industries and private versus public activities 
generally yield higher ERPs than those for more aggregated products groups (see, for 
example, Kheir-El-Din (1998) and Nathan Associates (1998)).  
 
One of the reasons for the higher estimates from disaggregated industry measurements is 
the likelihood that the individual estimates take into account the otherwise offsetting 
levels of protection among industries. Our estimates show that there is considerably more 
dispersion among the ERPs of industries than among their NRPs, which suggests that 
some industries are more protected relative to others than is revealed by the level of 
protection on their output.  
 
At the individual industry level, most of the ERPs exceed their corresponding NRPs, 
especially the industries producing soaps and cosmetics, motor vehicles, carpets and rugs, 
bakery products, meat preservation, certain fats, and macaroni and related products. 
Private and public sector ERPs mimic each other somewhat, although there are 
significant level differences and sometimes differences in ranking. For example, motor 
vehicles are much more protected in terms of ERP in the private than in the public sector.  
 
These results generally suggest that the tariff schedule favors some industries to a much 
greater extent than suggested by the nominal tariff rates. To the extent that these 
industries are able to lucratively “pull” resources toward them and away from the less 
protected sectors, the existing tariff structure produces a misallocation of resources from 
investors expanding output in the protected sectors.  
 
The level of effective protection in the sample industries has been calculated under each 
of the alternative reform strategies discussed in Chapter 2. The results were as follows: 
 
Free Trade: In the absence of any protection, all tariffs would be zero and so the 
NRPs and the ERPs would also be zero. Firms in industries that are afforded high 
levels of effective protection relative to other sectors would expect to see profits 
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greatly reduced by the removal of such protection, while those with low levels of 
protection would face a more level playing field in their input markets. Moreover, 
export-oriented firms would experience a movement from negative to neutral 
incentives and, on balance, these firms would expand output and employment. 
Table 4.1:  Industry-Level Effective Protection under Existing and Alternative Reforms 
( percent)  
  ERP under Alternative Reforms
 NRP ERP Two-Tier Concertina 
Sector Averages: 24.6 64.7 34.3 46.1 
  Agriculture 25.3 93.0 40.8 62.8 
  Industrial Public Sector 23.9 51.5 32.7 40.0 
  Industrial Private Sector 24.6 51.2 30.9 37.9 
Sector Standard Deviations: 13.9 75.4 16.4 52.8 
  Agriculture 19.0 110.9 21.7 75.6 
  Industrial Public Sector 10.9 39.0 10.2 35.9 
  Industrial Private Sector 10.4 37.5 9.3 25.6 
Source: Volume 5 of present study. 
 
 
Uniform Tariffs: If all tariffs were to be set at the revenue neutral rate of 16 
percent, then the ERP for each industry would equal the corresponding 16 percent 
NRP. Those firms whose current ERPs are above 16 percent would confront a less 
favorable treatment, and those below the new uniform rate would see their 
relatively unfavorable treatment enhanced. The direction of the overall output 
effects would thus resemble free trade, a compelling argument for uniform tariffs, 
although the import-competing industries would still be favored over the 
exporting oriented industries.  
 
Two-Tier Tariffs: Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, we adopted a tariff for 
outputs of 20 percent and a tariff for inputs of 15 percent for all industries. 
Generally, the overall ERP fall from 65 to 34 percent, with the greatest decline 
occurring in the agricultural industries (from 93 to 41 percent, with a decline in 
the standard deviation of the tariff schedule from 111 to 22 percent. For the more 
industrial sectors, both average ERPs of the public and private sectors fall from 51 
to 31 percent, and the standard deviations fall from nearly 40 to around 10. 
 
Concertina Tariff: In general, the concertina approach reduces the effective 
protection of the industries considerably less than any of the other reform 
strategies. In comparison to the 34 percent average rate under the two-tier tariff 
structure, the average tariff is 46 percent. This approach would cut most output 
tariffs as well as many input tariffs. While some tariffs are raised, none are raised 
by as much as with the two-tier experiment. Consequently, effective protection is 
not reduced by as much as the two-tier ERP. The increased standard deviation 
relative to the two-tier reform results from the existence of more tariff brackets. 
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4.3 Output Response to Reform 
 
Using estimates of the supply relationships for each of the industries in our sample, we 
derived the impact of reforms on the output responses of those industries.8 Output 
changes incorporate two types of adjustments. The first is the increase or decrease in 
output due to tariff-induced cost adjustments. The second is the movement along the 
supply curve brought about by the output price change from the tariff reform. Even if all 
tariffs were reduced, output could expand or contract. The net effect of any tariff reform 
on output and employment at the industry level is therefore an empirical issue, which are 
summarized for the alternative reform strategies as follows: 
 
Free Trade: With tariff escalation, free trade would result in a contraction of most 
import-competing sectors, and export-oriented industries would benefit from the 
elimination of input tariffs. Despite the contraction for firms directing their output 
to the domestic market, the adverse impact of losing output protection is 
substantially mitigated by the cheaper tradable inputs. For example, despite the 
fall in price due to a loss of tariff protection of nearly 30 percent for carpets and 
rugs in the private sector, the output reduction is greatly reduced by a nearly 16 
percent decrease in costs owing to a reduction in tradable input duties. This cost 
reduction effect is significant in other contracting industries as well. 
 
Uniform Tariff: With a 16 percent revenue neutral uniform tariff, output for many 
industries in the more industrial sector falls by nearly as much as free trade. The 
decline, however, is caused by Egypt’s escalation of its current tariff structure. 
While output tariffs are considerably reduced, tariffs on tradable inputs are 
generally higher after reform. The resulting cost increases therefore contributes to 
the output reduction.  
 
Concertina Tariff: This type of tariff structure generally causes the least 
contraction in import-competing firms. For industry final goods, tariffs would be 
maintained at relatively high rates, and input tariffs would be lowered, thereby 
reducing costs and encouraging output expansion 
 
Two-Tier Tariff: With tariffs of 15 percent for inputs and 20 percent for outputs, 
there is a more modest output effect than with the uniform tariff since there are 
relatively higher output tariffs and lower input tariffs than with the uniform tariff 
reform. Negative effects on import-competing firms are lower than with the 
uniform tariff because the two-tier output tariff is higher and the input tariff is 
lower than with the uniform rate of 16 percent. 
                                                 
8 Estimates of the industry supply relationship were based on a log-linear distributed lag model with price, 
and income or a time trend as the explanatory variables. 
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4.4 Factor Market Adjustments 
 
Relative price changes caused by tariff reforms would be accompanied by output changes 
and associated changes in the demand for factors of production such as labor, land, and 
capital. Past experiences of other countries are not useful guidelines for the impact of 
trade liberalization on labor and other factor markets since many trade reform episodes 
have be concurrently undertaken with macroeconomic stabilization policies (Harrison 
and Revenga, 1998). Concerns by policy-makers embarking on tariff reform are 
grounded on fears that short-term adjustments costs might include rising poverty and 
unemployment, which could threaten the sustainability of reforms. In the capital markets, 
there is ambivalence over the impact of trade reform on foreign investment, and 
specifically whether liberalization will attract new investment or lead existing investment 
to leave the country. 
 
Drawing on both the present industry-level analysis and several studies commissioned by 
the DEPRA project, we examine available evidence on the linkage between trade reform, 
labor and other factor markets and FDI. The evidence suggests that employment and 
wage effects of trade reform are generally small. First, labor is fairly dynamic in the face 
of change and real wages are relatively flexible. Second, the informal sector operates 
outside of much of the regulatory environment, and the lack of compliance and 
enforcement of labor market regulations allows labor markets to adjust quickly to 
changing circumstances. Third, trade reforms are often implemented in conjunction with 
other reforms, including broad-based tax and exchange rate reforms that offset any short-
term adjustment costs. Finally, there is clearer evidence that trade reforms attract rather 
than dampen foreign investment because of the positive attitude towards foreign 
investment directed at export-oriented industries that often accompanies trade reform. 
 
Labor Markets 
 
Assuming fixed labor-output requirements in the short run, we calculated the 
employment changes associated with trade reforms using the output adjustment estimates 
described in the previous section. The results show that employment effects tend to 
mirror the output changes induced by adjustment to any new tariff structure: the free 
trade reform is associated with the largest declines in the demand for labor in the 
impacted industries and the concertina tariff reform with the smallest declines. There are, 
however, significant differences at the industry level. For example, in the public sector, 
iron and steel requires a smaller decline in employment with the two-tier reform than 
with the concertina reform, while the glass and glass products industry has exactly the 
opposite experience. Furthermore, the demand for labor of some industries increases even 
for the import-competing sectors under consideration. For example, in the public sector, 
drugs and medicine require more labor in every reform scenario except free trade. In the 
more agricultural products sector, the concertina reform in particular leads to 
employment expansion even for import-competing firms in several industries. 
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Several recent studies suggest that trade reform has had positive impacts on employment, 
even in the short-run, in a variety of countries. For example, a World Bank study 
(Papageorgiou, Choksi, and Michaely (1990)) concludes that trade liberalization did not 
result in decreased employment in the short run. A more recent study by Matusz and Tarr 
(1999) found that in virtually every case of trade reform, the degree of adjustment has 
been relatively small compared with the natural dynamics of the labor force. The 
flexibility and mobility of the labor force is clearly a critical factor in assessing the ability 
of the labor force to shift from declining to expanding sectors without creating much 
unemployment. 
 
In Egypt labor adjustment need not be very disruptive if the reform package were 
implemented over a period of as short as two or three years given estimated labor 
turnover rates in the industries studied. Survey data indicate a “natural” turnover rate of 
8.5 percent for Egyptian firms on average, which means that even a 17 percent required 
labor force reduction could be accomplished over this period through retirements and 
voluntary separations for the average firm. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
There is some evidence that much of the FDI is in fact “tariff jumping” by foreign 
investors hoping to prosper in the domestic Egyptian market with the benefit of 
protection from offshore competition. About 56 percent of foreign investment is 
currently targeted at the protected manufacturing sector. Most recently, chemical 
products and iron and steel have been particularly attractive sectors to FDI.  
 
To the extent that the foreigners invest in Egypt to take advantage of protected markets, 
the investment drains foreign exchange reserves. The reason is that the foreign capital is 
paid its value marginal product at artificially high domestic prices, and when profits are 
repatriated the foreign capital receives a return over and above the value of what it 
produced measured at world prices (see, for example, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 
(1977)). With trade liberalization, foreign investors in Egypt would have a strong 
incentive to redirect its activities to less protected sectors.  
 
Since there is strong evidence that trade reforms and macroeconomic stability have a 
much more positive impact on FDI inflows that protected industries, customs duty 
exemptions, and tax holidays for foreign investors, Egypt’s favorable macroeconomic 
climate and proposed trade policy reforms should stimulate foreign investment inflows 
into the country’s true comparative advantage industries. 
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5.0 Fiscal Revenue Implications 
 
 
5.1 Background 
 
The GOE’s macroeconomic stabilization policies have been aimed at creating the 
fundamental conditions needed for internal and external balance, anchoring the nominal 
exchange rate, and removing price distortions through economic reforms encompassing 
trade liberalization, fiscal reform, privatization and deregulation. Fiscal stabilization has 
been one of the key ingredients for the establishment of the fundamental conditions 
needed for macroeconomic stability, while the nominal exchange rate anchor has been 
used to facilitate disinflation. Since taxes on international trade represent one-fifth of the 
Government’s total tax revenue, any discussion about trade liberalization must weigh the 
fiscal revenue implications against efforts to further integrate the Egyptian economy into 
the global economy. Moreover, a new round of trade liberalization under the current 
nominal exchange rate anchor could aggravate the trade deficit and thereby undermine 
the external balance.  
 
It is in the context of the need to coordinate this broad set of macroeconomic stabilization 
and economic reform policies that the present study has included the design and 
estimation of a macroeconomic model to assess trade and exchange rate policy reforms 
(for a description, see Volume II, Annex IV, of this study). The model is designed to 
support the formulation and sequencing of a new round of trade policy reforms in a 
manner that is economically and technically viable, supporting the GOE’s overall reform 
program, and responsive to private sector needs. By its very nature, however, it also 
provides a broad analytical framework for the GOE to examine the macroeconomic 
stabilization and economic reform policies needed to move the country into a higher 
growth trajectory.  
 
Macroeconomic Context of Trade Policy Reforms 
 
The GOE’s strategy for stabilization has been rooted in policies aimed at (a) establishing 
the fundamental conditions needed for internal and external balance, (b) pegging the 
exchange rate, and (c) removing price distortions through economic reforms 
encompassing trade liberalization, fiscal reform, privatization and deregulation. Internal 
balance in output and inflation has been achieved through fiscal stabilization and 
monetary restraints. The successful reduction in the fiscal deficit from 20 percent of GDP 
in 1990/91 to around 1 percent in 1998/99 reflected both revenue increases and 
expenditure cutbacks. The earlier fiscal deficits and large liquidity expansion needed to 
finance those deficits had helped to maintain annual inflation rates of around 20 percent 
in the 1980s, but with fiscal austerity, inflation eventually decelerated to around 4 percent 
after 1997. The Government has opted to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, and 
that disinflation strategy has been supplemented by strict monetary and credit controls. 
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External balance was initially achieved through a series of nominal depreciations 
between 1989 and 1991 that helped to reverse the large current account deficits during 
the first part of the 1990s. Adjustments of the trade balance did not, however, contribute 
as much to the improvement as did those of the services balance. Merchandise exports 
contracted in the early part of the decade and remained sluggish until the middle of the 
decade. Although those exports grew by 11 percent annually in that period, they fell 
sharply in 1998 as a result of the Asian crisis-induced global trade recession. Under these 
conditions, the value of goods exported at the end of the 1990s only reached about two-
thirds of its existing value at the beginning of the decade and, consequently, Egypt’s 
share of world trade fell from 0.14 to 0.06 percent during the decade. In contrast, 
merchandise imports expanded by nearly 50 percent during the decade, notwithstanding 
sharp cutbacks in 1991-92. The effect of these developments on the economy have been 
large since the combined value of exports and imports of goods and non-factor services 
currently represents 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
 
The resulting trade deficit has been only partly compensated by income from invisible 
transactions in the form of tourism receipts, Suez Canal dues and workers’ remittances, 
and these revenue sources tend to be unstable. Capital inflows have increasingly been 
relied upon to finance the growing current account deficit, but these inflows have 
required aggressive sterilization on the part of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) to offset 
the increase in foreign capital. Initially, the initial impact of sterilization on lowering 
interest rates lent support to rising investor confidence in the pegged exchange rate 
system, but foreign direct investment (FDI) and other net capital inflows have fallen short 
of the current account deficit.  
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is no doubt that Egypt has prospered under its 
macroeconomic policies. The benefits of the Government’s strategy have included low 
inflation, disciplined financial policy, and a stable external environment. Capital inflows 
have bolstered the country’s long-term growth prospects by increasing investment and 
confidence. Trade conditions have also improved from a decade ago. The GOE has 
moved from import substitution policies to an export-led strategy based on a series of 
trade policy reforms instituted that have aimed at liberalizing trade through three types of 
measures. First, import tariffs have been reduced; second, quantitative import measures 
have been replaced with tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade have been greatly 
reduced; and third, exports have been promoted through the easing of administrative 
procedures. While these measures have gradually opened trading activities to the private 
sector, the Government recognizes that high levels of import restrictions remain that, 
despite offering domestic industries substantial protection from foreign competition, give 
rise to inefficiencies in the economy and reduce the international competitiveness of 
firms.  
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TARIFF REFORM IN EGYPT 
 
VOLUME I: MAIN REPORT 
 
 
 
 
26
 
Fiscal Revenue Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Reforms 
 
The efficiency gains from further trade liberalization need to be weighed against the 
Government’s strategy for achieving internal balance, largely through fiscal austerity and 
the maintenance of fiscal revenues. While total tax revenue since the start of the reforms 
has remained fairly stable relative to GDP, non-tax revenue has contracted from 14 to 
less than 9 percent of GDP between the start and end of the last decade. Tax revenue has 
therefore had to support an increasingly larger portion of fiscal expenditures, and since 
taxes on international trade currently represent about one-fifth of the Government’s total 
tax revenue, the fiscal revenue implications of such an initiative are especially important 
to the GOE.  
 
Without exchange rate realignment, a new round of trade liberalization under the existing 
nominal exchange rate anchor could aggravate the trade deficit and further undermine the 
external imbalance. Although the pegged exchange rate system has been successfully 
used as part of the Government’s disinflation strategy, it has also resulted in large and 
pervasive deterioration in Egypt’s international competitiveness. In the last decade alone, 
Egypt’s real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciated by 66 percent, partly as a result 
of the nominal exchange rate appreciation, but mainly as a consequence of substantial 
inflation differentials with partner countries. A reversal in that trend would ideally come 
about through an equilibrium exchange rate that not only yield a current account balance 
that was consistent with capital inflows, but one that also generate an internal balance in 
terms of output, inflation and employment.  
 
5.2 The Macroeconomic Model 
 
The study extends an earlier elasticities-absorption approach to the balance of payments 
to the analysis of the consequences of tariff reforms on the Egyptian macro-economy, 
particularly as it relates to fiscal revenue implications.9  Since capital movements and the 
extent of their mobility play a critical role in the analysis of economic policies, we also 
consider alternative assumptions about policies impacting on their mobility. While trade 
liberalization by itself is likely to improve the efficiency of the economy and therefore 
impact on output and employment, it may also aggravate the current account imbalance. 
We therefore include in the analysis complementary exchange rate adjustments that 
would help to produce a sustainable balance of payments and move the Egyptian 
economy closer to overall equilibrium.  
 
 
                                                 
9 The elasticities approach to the balance of payments is described in an earlier study by DEPRA (Lord, 
1999). It examines the conditions needed to determine the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) 
for Egypt’s balance of payments.  
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5.3 Policy Impact Assessments 
 
Three sets of simulations have been performed with the model. The first provides the 
benchmark against which policy impact assessments are measured. The second set 
assesses the impact of alternative trade liberalization policies that include free trade, 
concertina, two-tier, a uniform, and a combination of two-tier and uniform rate tariffs. 
The final set evaluates the impact of a real effective exchange rate devaluation to 
neutralize the initial effects of trade policy reforms on the balance of payments, the 
national income accounts on the expenditure-side, and the money supply, prices and real 
exchange rate. Such a realignment in the exchange rate often accompanies trade 
liberalization to bring the exchange rate more in line with a level that is consistent with a 
sustainable medium-term external position under a situation in which there are lower 
trade barriers. 
 
The forecasts generated by the model are indicative of the direction of the economy and 
should be interpreted with caution since the model results depend on key assumptions 
and are demand-driven, insofar as they exclude details about the production-side of the 
economy. Nevertheless, the results provide a parsimonious representation of the Egyptian 
economy that yield an internally consistent set of estimates about the likely outcome of 
events over the next few years. For the baseline forecast, they therefore point to important 
issues about the near-term prospects of the economy. 
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Table 5.1  
Impact of Alternative Tariff Structures on Key Macroeconomic Indicators 
(Annual percent change and average annual US dollars) 
  2000-2004 2005-2009 
Trade Balance (average annual Mil. US dollars)   
Current Tariff Structure                  (10,742)                  (14,570) 
Free Trade                  (11,596)                  (16,396) 
Concertina                  (10,811)                  (14,729) 
Two-Tier                  (10,829)                  (14,796) 
Uniform                  (10,835)                  (14,788) 
Combination                  (10,843)                  (14,795) 
Import Duties / Total Tax Revenue (percent)   
Current Tariff Structure 18.1% 16.4% 
Free Trade 6.4% 0.0% 
Concertina 15.1% 13.2% 
Two-Tier 15.4% 12.4% 
Uniform 15.4% 12.5% 
Combination 15.4% 12.5% 
Trade tax collection rate (duties/imports)   
Current Tariff Structure 17.9% 17.9% 
Free Trade 7.2% 0.0% 
Concertina 15.0% 13.1% 
Two-Tier 16.9% 16.3% 
Uniform 16.8% 16.1% 
Combination 16.5% 16.1% 
Import Duties / GDP (percent)   
Current Tariff Structure 3.1% 2.9% 
Free Trade 1.1% 0.0% 
Concertina 2.5% 2.2% 
Two-Tier 2.5% 2.2% 
Uniform 2.5% 2.1% 
Combination 2.5% 2.1% 
Fiscal deficit / GDP (percent)    
Current Tariff Structure -1.5% -2.4% 
Free Trade -2.9% -3.9% 
Concertina -1.9% -2.7% 
Two-Tier -1.9% -2.8% 
Uniform -1.9% -2.8% 
Combination -1.9% -2.8% 
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Fiscal Impact of Trade Liberalization 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the effect of alternative tariff strategies on fiscal revenue and the 
GOE budget. In general, the results are consistent with expectations about the operation 
and effect on the Egyptian economy from trade liberalization. The results for trade and 
key macroeconomic variables were discussed in Chapter 3. The smaller expansion of 
imports under the alternative strategies than under complete free trade generates a lower 
trade deficit. Given the similarity in the average tariff rates among the various strategies, 
they produce little, if any, differences in their fiscal impact. 
 
Exchange Rate Adjustments during Trade Liberalization 
 
A devaluation is often needed to counter the trade balance effect of trade liberalization. In 
the present model, the overall results of the estimated import and export demand 
functions, as well as foreign direct investment, support generalizations to the effect that 
the exchange rate significantly impacts on Egypt’s balance of payments. For the 
Government’s fiscal position, the devaluation increases the domestic currency value of 
imports and the associated trade tax revenue. On the expenditure side, the fall in the 
relative price of tradables and rise in that of wages and non-tradables produces a less than 
proportional response of the exchange rate devaluation to that of trade liberalization 
because of the substitution in production or consumption of tradables and non-tradables. 
Trade liberalization will cause the private sector price of non-tradables to rise. Since the 
Government is either exempt from tariffs or pays the tariff to itself, the liberalization of 
trade does not impact on the pubic sector’s cost of tradables. But in the case of a 
devaluation, the relative cost of tradables to the public sector rises, thereby worsening the 
fiscal deficit and requiring overall expenditure cutbacks. The experiences of other 
countries suggest that these fiscal deficit effects need to be corrected early in the trade 
and exchange rate reform processes.  
 
The magnitude of the effects of exchange rate changes on Egypt’s balance of payments 
and the economy in general can be readily calculated through multiplier analysis. The 
results indicate how exchange rate changes influence the current and capital accounts, the 
overall balance of payments, and the national income accounts. Table 5.2 illustrates the 
effect of a one-time 10-percent devaluation in Egypt’s real effective exchange rate. The 
devaluation is based on an across-the-board devaluation of the Egyptian pound relative to 
each of the country’s major trading partners. As such, it considers the effect of a real 
cross-rate devaluation of the Egyptian pound in each of its major export products and 
geographic markets. For imports and foreign direct investment, the devaluation is at the 
world market level, since a devaluation of the Egyptian pound would not influence the 
source of Egypt’s imports.  
 
The results show that a 10-percent real effective exchange rate devaluation would 
significantly impact on Egypt’s economy. In the balance of payments, merchandise 
exports adjust almost entirely within the first period. A 10-percent devaluation leads to a 
6.7 percent expansion in the US dollar value of exports in the year of the devaluation and 
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a 7 percent expansion in the medium term. Imports adjust more slowly, but their response 
to the feedback effect between the effect of the devaluation on the balance of payments 
and the national income account eventually leads them to expand by more than their level 
under a constant exchange rate. Initially, the value of imports would decline, but the 
expansion in real GDP associated with the improved balance of trade on goods and non-
factor services eventually leads to an increase in imports, albeit by a substantially smaller 
growth rate than that of exports. A similar situation to that of merchandise trade occurs 
with trade in services. In the capital account, the devaluation leads to a substantial 
contraction in foreign direct investment. The reason is that the real effective exchange 
rate devaluation increases the cost of imported material inputs and thereby lowers the 
incentive to expand cross-border production facilities in Egypt. It is likely, however, that 
with lower costs of imported material inputs under reduced trade barriers and an 
unprotected market, foreign direct investment will shift from inward-oriented production 
to outward-oriented production. These structural shifts are not considered in the present 
model, but could be introduced were more details FDI information available for 
industries. 
 
With the 10 percent devaluation, the fiscal situation improves in the medium run, 
notwithstanding an initial contraction in trade taxes of 2.8 percent below the equivalent 
revenue with a constant exchange rate. However, trade taxes expand by over 4 percent 
above the constant exchange rate solution in the medium term because of the economic 
growth induced expansion in imports. Real GDP grows by nearly 2 percent more than 
without a change in the real exchange rate, and it expands by over 3 percent in the 
medium term. In the short run, the expansion is driven by private consumption, and in the 
medium term it is private consumption, gross capital investment and exports that generate 
the economic expansion. 
 
These results point to the effectiveness of exchange rate changes in Egypt as an 
equilibrating instrument for the current account and one that can be used to replace trade 
restrictions an instrument with which to achieve a sustainable medium-term external 
position. For fiscal revenue the results show that the elimination of the overvaluation of 
the Egyptian pound expands the share of trade taxes following the initial contraction and, 
because of the positive tax revenue effect, the devaluation leads to a medium-term 
improvement in the fiscal balance. Moreover, the elimination of the overvalued currency 
substantially expands the real value of imports measured in domestic prices. As a result, 
there are positive medium-term effects on the fiscal balance from the larger domestically 
priced tax base and the larger tax revenue generated from increased investment and 
consumption by the private sector. 
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Table 5.2: Effect of 10% Devaluation on Egypt’s Economy  
(Percentages)       
  Unit of  M u l t i p l i e r (%) 
  Account I m p a c t T o t a l 
Balance of Payments   
  Goods: Exports f.o.b. Nominal US$ 6.7% 7.0%
  Goods: Imports f.o.b. Nominal US$ -2.8% 4.1%
  Services: Credit Nominal US$ 1.2% 2.7%
  Services: Debit Nominal US$ -2.5% 3.1%
  Direct Investment in Egypt Nominal US$ -7.9% -8.5%
National Income Accounts   
Exports of Goods and NFS Constant LE 1.6% 3.6%
Imports of Goods and NFS Constant LE -2.7% 3.9%
Total Investment Constant LE -0.7% 2.8%
Total Consumption Constant LE 1.9% 3.2%
Government Consumption Constant LE 0.0% 2.9%
Private Consumption Constant LE 2.2% 3.3%
Gross Domestic Product Constant LE 1.7% 3.1%
Government Revenue and Expenditures    
Total Revenue  Constant LE -0.5% 2.7%
Tax Revenue Constant LE -0.7% 3.4%
Tax on trade Constant LE -2.8% 4.1%
Others Constant LE -0.2% 3.2%
Total Expenditures Constant LE 0.0% 2.1%
Current Expenditure Constant LE 0.0% 2.9%
Wages Constant LE -0.2% 3.2%
Other expenditures Constant LE 0.1% 2.7%
 Source: Volume II, Annex IV of present study.       
 
 
 
While issues of public finance are beyond the scope of the present analysis, it is clear 
from the present fiscal impact assessment of trade liberalization in Egypt that tax reform 
needs to be an integral part of tariff reforms. Tariff reform should be viewed as part of a 
broader program of tax reform that supports the transition from a large dependence on 
trade taxes for fiscal revenue to a broad tax revenue base that ensures revenue growth and 
stability and increases productivity at the firm level from the more efficient use of 
existing resources under freer trade. 
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6.0 Global Consequences 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Background 
 
The rapid expansion of global production and markets in the last two decades has given 
rise to systemic changes in the world economy. The introduction of new technologies 
through cross-border production networks and the dissemination of new skills in the 
workforce have now become as important to the specialization of production activities in 
countries as their capital, labor and natural resource endowments. For Egypt, however, 
these changes have not generated a proportional expansion of international transactions 
and capital flows, nor have they created the widespread diffusion of production, 
transportation, and communication technologies that has been evident in other developing 
countries. During the 1990s, for example, FDI inflows into Egypt increased by an 
average of less than 8 percent a year, nearly one-half the 15 percent annual growth in the 
rest of the world.  
 
More strikingly for Egypt, the US 
dollar value of exports contracted 
by an average of 5.4 percent in the 
1990’s, compared with a 7 percent 
average annual growth of world 
trade. As a result, Egypt’s market 
share in the global economy is now 
half of what it was at the beginning 
of the 1990s. In large part, this 
lackluster performance is the result 
of Egypt’s trade policy. Out of the 26 countries examined, no country exhibited a higher 
number of import barriers than Egypt and, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Egypt has one of 
the highest average tariff rates in the world.  
Figure 6.1
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To evaluate the prospect of globalization on Egypt under its present trade regime and the 
possible effects of alternative liberalization strategies on its world market position, the 
present study used a global general equilibrium model to compare the Egyptian economy 
in a projected 2005 baseline to an alternative set of projected 2005 scenarios under the 
alternative liberalization strategies. Like other recent applications of CGE analysis to 
trade liberalization, the study relied on a modified version of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) database and its general-equilibrium framework (Hertel, 1997) for the 
analysis of tariff liberalization. The baseline scenario involves projection of the global 
economy using the scheduled Uruguay Round liberalizations and World Bank 
macroeconomic forecasts through the year 2005. 
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6.2 Modeling Approach 
 
The multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is characterized by an 
input-output structure based on regional and national input-output tables that explicitly 
links industries in a value added chain from primary goods, over continuously higher 
stages of intermediate processing, to the final assembling of goods and services for 
consumption. Inter-sectoral linkages are direct, like the input of steel in the production of 
transport equipment, and indirect, via intermediate use in other sectors. The model 
captures these linkages by modeling firms' use of factors and intermediate inputs. Within 
each region, firms produce output, employing land, labor, and capital, and combining 
these with intermediate inputs. Firm output is purchased by consumers, government, the 
investment sector, and by other firms. Firm output can also be sold for export. Land is 
only employed in the agricultural sectors, while capital and labor (both skilled and 
unskilled) are mobile between all production sectors. Capital is fully mobile within 
regions. However, capital movements between regions are not modelled, but rather are 
held fixed in all simulations. Labor mobility is discussed below. All demand sources 
combine imports with domestic goods to produce a composite good. These are called 
Armington composites.  
 
The data were derived from a number of sources. Data on production and trade are based 
on national social accounting data linked through trade flows. With the exception of 
Egypt, these social accounting data are drawn directly from the GTAP database. Egyptian 
data are based on value added and input-output data from CAPMAS, along with more 
detailed Moroccan input-output coefficients, and along with trade data and macro data 
from the World Bank and the GTAP consortium. The resulting global dataset is 
benchmarked to 1997, and includes detailed national input-output, trade, and final 
demand structures. The basic social accounting and trade data are supplemented with 
trade policy data, including additional data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
 
6.3 Impact Assessment  
 
Cost of Non-Adjustment 
 
One way to consider an import reform program is to examine the costs of not reforming 
and adjusting to global markets. In the case of tariff reductions, the costs of non-
adjustment would include foregoing the benefits of reform. The benefits that are foregone 
are many. First, they include foregoing output growth insofar as countries that have 
undertaken reforms have grown faster than those that have not. Higher growth rates result 
from static gains, from an improved allocation of resources, and from dynamic gains, 
from gaining access to technology and know how that allow countries like Egypt to move 
closer to the world technological frontier. A second cost of non-adjustment would result 
from giving up a higher rate of employment creation, due to both a lower output growth 
rate and the reallocation of resources into more labor-intensive activities in which Egypt 
has a comparative advantage. Third, not undertaking reforms would mean foregoing the 
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reallocation of resources and a further loss in competitiveness as other countries reform 
their trade regimes and move forward. Egypt’s place in world markets could fall further, 
which would also have implications for both growth and employment creation. Finally, 
there is the cost of reducing or halting the pace of reform, which would send a signal to 
market agents, including investors, that the country is not sustaining its reform efforts. 
 
The baseline scenario for the global economy from 1997 through 2005 allows us to 
identify the cost of non-adjustment for the Egyptian economy associated with global 
economic developments. Changes in output can be expected in Egypt, not only from 
growth within the economy itself, but more importantly from growth in the economies of 
trading partners. In addition, the trade policy regime of Egypt's trading partners also 
changes as a result of Uruguay Round commitments. The net impact of these changes is a 
rather dramatic increase in both light and heavy manufactures. The model sectors 
involved include other machinery (annual growth of 15 percent), other manufactures 
(annual growth of 7 percent), fabricated metals (annual growth of 7 percent), and leather 
products (annual growth of 6 percent). It is important to underscore that these changes 
take place in the context of projected 4 percent annual growth in GDP between 1997 and 
2005. A number of sectors such as minerals and the agriculture sector lag behind as the 
economy shifts towards manufacturing activities. Some manufacturing activities such as 
transportation equipment, however, are expected to contract (annual growth of -6.3 
percent) in response to increased supplies from foreign markets. 
 
Effects of Trade Liberalization 
 
The reform strategy examined with this model reflects a different version of those 
undertaken elsewhere in this study. It involes complete elimination of tariffs and the 
application of a single GST to domestic production and imports. This alternative scenario 
involves a total indirect tax that leaves GOE revenue unchanged. Because the model is 
inherently a medium to long-run model, we do not examine year-to-year changes in the 
implementation strategies, as is done elsewhere in the study. The 25 percent GST that 
emerges from the results differs from that used elsewhere in this study for two reasons:  
the present analysis starts from a different base year, and it treatment indirect tax 
interactions through input-output linkages and factor market linkages between sectors. 
 
The results of this strategy are dramatic at the sector and industry levels (see Table 6.1). 
Those exports most likely to benefit are leather, fabricated metals, garments, wood and 
electrical machinery, while large contractions are expected in exports of basic metals, 
transport equipment, mining, minerals and textiles. The growth of clothing exports is 
impressive under the new tax structure (annual growth of 15 percent), since the current 
indirect tax structure discriminates against those types of exports. Instead, it favors 
agriculture and transport equipment, at the expense of light manufactures and the 
machinery sectors. 
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Table 6.1:  Projected Changes in Egyptian Exports, by Sector 
(Annual percent change from 1997-2005) 
 
  Baseline 
Tariff and 
Tax Reform
Leather 21.6 42.8 
Fabricated Metals 16.9 36.7 
Other Machinery 15.7 32.3 
Other Manufactures 15.5 30.0 
Garments 4.6 15.1 
Wood Products 6.9 14.1 
Other Services 7.7 11.4 
Electrical Machinery 5.3 10.5 
Chemicals 2.6 5.1 
Construction 2.7 4.6 
Refining 3.7 4.3 
Food 4.2 4.0 
Other Utilities 3.0 2.8 
Petroleum 1.9 2.0 
Trans Comm 1.5 1.0 
TFI 1.3 0.6 
Paper Pub 0.0 -0.6 
Crops 2.3 -0.7 
Beverages and Tobacco -0.4 -2.3 
Livestock 0.1 -2.9 
Textiles -2.7 -3.7 
Electrical Utilities -3.0 -3.8 
Minerals -3.7 -5.4 
Mining -7.0 -7.2 
Transport Equipment -7.8 -8.8 
Basic Metals -9.3 -11.3 
 
Implications of Globalization 
 
Ongoing growth in trade and incomes in the global economy will yield pressure for 
change in Egypt. On the positive side, this change will bring with it a further growth of 
the services and manufacturing sector, and further growth in national income. On the 
negative side, some sectors will be under pressure to contract. Textiles, for example, can 
be expected to lose market share as the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is phased out 
by 2005. At the same time, there are opportunities for further gain if Egypt also 
undertakes domestic and trade tax reform. Such reform also can be expected to benefit 
some export sectors like garments in which Egypt has natural comparative advantages. 
Due to the well-established link between import restrictions and poor export 
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performance, we can expect an economy-wide improvement in Egypt's export 
performance with tariff liberalization.  
 
 
7.0 Strategy Design and Implementation 
 
 
7.1 Underlying Principles 
 
The GOE has signaled it commitment to further liberalization measures through its 
obligations to the WTO and other donor-sponsored programs. The Government has also 
informally indicated its willingness to further liberalize trade by restructuring and 
reducing tariffs, although it has not yet revealed a strategy preference. Against this 
background, the guiding objectives communicated to the study team in examining 
alternative tariff liberalization strategies have been that tariff reforms should have the 
following characteristics:  
 
? Tariff reforms should be as revenue-neutral as possible  
? Tariff reforms should cause as few disruptions to employment as possible  
? Tariff reforms should have a minimal effect on Egypt’s important industries  
 
Tariff revenues losses are a particular concern to the GOE because a revenue decline 
could lead to a macroeconomic imbalance if there were no concurrent reduction in 
expenditures. The resulting budget deficit, if financed by borrowing from the banking 
system, could then fuel inflation, cause an appreciation of the exchange rate, and 
undermine the liberalization effort. Hence, considerable effort has been made in this 
study to examine the revenue implications of trade liberalization. If the experience of 
other countries serves as a guideline, there will be higher GDP growth associated with 
tariff reduction, which will help to increase imports and tariff revenues. These effects are 
quantified in Volume II, Annex IV, and the results summarized in Chapter 3 of this 
report.  
 
To provide the GOE with the broadest set of alternatives in this study, we have examined 
the consequences of restructuring Egypt’s tariffs using the most commonly applied 
reform strategies based on the concertina method, the two-tier method, a uniform tariff, 
and a combination that sequences the two-tier and uniform tariff methods. We have also 
examined the case of free trade to serve as a benchmark for the other strategies. 
 
In assessing each strategy, we have considered four fundamental criteria based on 
Egypt’s tariff regime and the experience of other developing countries. First, the tariff 
regime should strive for low protection. The extent of protection that the country is 
prepared to provide must be largely determined by how much competitiveness it wants to 
achieve. Egypt can ill afford to maintain its past level of protection while foreign 
competitors reform trade policies and increase their competitiveness. 
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Second, Egypt will need to achieve neutrality of incentives among activities so that no 
activity is favored compared to others. One of the best ways to achieve this is to make 
tariffs the only form of protection and have a uniform tariff. In such a case, the variance 
in nominal tariffs will have zero or close to zero.  
 
Third, as the country strives for neutral incentives through a uniform tariff, it must also 
attempt not to discriminate against input producing industries with tariff escalation. Low 
tariffs on these industries would mean a high effective rate of protection that will affect 
the competitiveness of the country adversely. So a low uniform tariff is an ideal. This 
would lead to low effective rates of protection, which in turn would make the economy 
more competitive than at present. 
 
Finally, the tariff structure must not only have a low uniform tariff as an ideal, it must 
also be predictable, transparent and administered in such a way that economic agents 
such as consumers, producers and investors can rely on the signals provided by prices 
that bear some established relationship to the tariff regime. Tariffs are the best-known 
transparent instrument of protection, and low uniform tariffs with low or no variance, 
administered in a predictable and transparent way, are best. This goal is achievable since 
some developing countries have either reached this ideal or are in the process of getting 
there quickly. 
 
7.2 Elements of an Import Liberalization Program  
 
The analysis in this study of Egypt’s present tariff regime and alternative reform 
strategies suggest an agenda for tariff reform in Egypt that would contain the following 
elements: 
 
? Reduce the overall tariff level from the present 20 percent to a rate more 
competitive with other countries and make tariffs the only instrument of 
protection.  
 
? Eliminate import surcharges and similar para-tariffs replacing them with 
consumption or excise taxes that do not discriminate between foreign and 
domestic goods. 
 
? Eliminate nominal tariff dispersion by moving to fewer rates in stages that would 
lead to a uniform tariff. 
 
? Eliminate nominal tariff escalation by not having different rates geared to the 
particular stage of processing.  
 
? Make access to foreign inputs through the duty drawback and temporary 
admission system automatic and eliminate undue delays in receiving drawbacks 
and exemptions from duties and taxes paid on inputs.  
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? Make tariff changes more transparent and predictable and undertaken by an 
independent group that is not beholden to any particular group or activity.  
 
? Make the exchange rate system more responsive to changes in domestic and 
international prices by moving toward a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
To ensure a smooth transition to the liberalization of tariffs, the findings of present study 
lead to the following recommendations for the design and implementation of a specific 
program in Egypt. First, it is important to aim toward the objectives of the ideal regime. 
These are to reduce tariffs, their dispersion and their escalation, and to move toward a 
uniform rate. Second, of the strategies discussed in this study, it was found that the 
concertina method was the best followed by the proportional reduction in tariff and the 
reduction in tariffs by equal amounts in relation to foreign price of the import. For 
strategic reasons, and to avoid short-term spikes in import protection, a combination of 
the strategies may be warranted during the transition period. The exact sequence should 
depend on the present tariff structure and the expected changes in imports, tax revenue 
and key macroeconomic and sector indicators resulting from the tariff reductions.  
 
Third, there are many tariffs that are redundant in the sense that their reduction would 
have no impact on resource allocation. These could be reduced without a problem. 
Similarly, there may be tariffs that do not reflect the political economy or the lobbying 
power of a particular activity in the sense that such tariffs are above those predicted by 
internal pressures for protection. In such cases a reduction of tariffs can also be made 
without much difficulty. For other tariffs, it is dangerous to fine-tune the tariff reduction 
dependent on the strength of the sector’s lobbying power, in the same way that one 
cannot tailor-make tariffs to suite each sector. Thus it is best to clearly define two or three 
simple rules to implement the strategies for tariff reduction.  
 
Finally, the sequence followed must be clearly defined both in terms of the different tariff 
rates that would be targeted and the time period. Thus one could announce, for example, 
a plan to reduce tariffs by a two-tier method in the first two years followed by another 
well-defined stage for the next two years leading to a uniform tariff in the fifth year.  
 
7.3 Complementary Measures 
 
Policies needed to complement import liberalization fall broadly into the following three 
categories: macroeconomic policies, exchange rate policies and the regulatory 
environment for domestic and foreign investment and the labor market. Each of these 
policy areas plays a crucial role in tariff reduction. In the macroeconomic area, monetary 
and fiscal policies are needed to achieve and maintain price stability, which are an 
essential ingredient of liberalization and a fundamental goal of the GOE. Inflation and the 
resulting unstable price levels interfere with the information content of relative prices and 
distort saving, investment, production, and consumption decisions. This lost information 
causes resource shifts and reduces the beneficial effects that could be expected from 
import liberalization. Additionally, the fate of an import regime depends very much on 
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proper macroeconomic policies being in place. The experience in other countries is that 
more than three fourths of the trade liberalization programs that failed did so because of 
inappropriate macroeconomic policies rather than deficiencies in the import liberalization 
program itself. 
 
Exchange rate policies determine the allocation of resources between tradable and non-
tradable goods. The exchange rate is an important macroeconomic price that helps to 
restore equilibrium. Import liberalization policies have to be consistent with the exchange 
rate policies for import liberalization to be beneficial to the economy. An exchange rate 
that is out of equilibrium, such as an appreciated currency, distorts incentives toward 
producing for the domestic market and subsidizes imports when tariffs are reduced. More 
often than not, import liberalization is undertaken in the context of an overall 
macroeconomic stabilization program in which exchange rate adjustments or regime 
changes are included. The success of an import liberalization program depends crucially 
on the exchange rate regime in place.  
 
Finally, the regulatory regime for investment and labor plays an important role in import 
liberalization. Otherwise resource shift that import liberalization attempts to achieve 
could be undermined by investment and labor market regulations. Countries, particularly 
the latecomers to industrialization, have to depend on foreign direct investment to secure 
market access in order to acquire technology and management skills at the earlier stages 
of import liberalization. Similarly, whether labor can move from one activity to another 
has a large effect on the costs of adjustment and the ability of the economy to smoothly 
shift resources. 
 
7.4 Sequencing and Timing of Reforms 
 
Most countries liberalized their trade regimes following an economic crisis, when the 
liberalizing forces could prevail over the protectionist forces. It does not, however, follow 
that Egypt should wait for a crisis to undertake import liberalization. It can be done from 
a more stable initial condition with the announcement of a credible path of import 
liberalization. In fact, the announcement itself could have a salutary effect on the 
domestic industries that the Government is ready to move to the next stage of trade 
reforms.  
 
For sequencing of import liberalization, four areas are relevant for Egypt. First, there is 
the issue of the proper sequencing of current account and capital account liberalization. 
Liberalizing imports and other portions of the current account often precedes liberalizing 
the capital account, as has occurred in East Asia since the financial crisis. If the capital 
account is opened first, there is the possibility of capital inflows taking place that could 
lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate and discourage the growth of exports. 
Another related factor favoring this sequence is that the domestic capital market may not 
be ready for capital market liberalization. Portfolio capital could flow in, but also flow 
out just as quickly and create instability. Moreover, the domestic banking system may 
have poor portfolios and inadequate prudential regulations so that the changing asset 
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prices (due in part to import liberalization) could create problems for managing the 
macroeconomic situation.  
 
Second, a proper sequence to follow in liberalizing imports is to make sure that the final 
goods and inputs are liberalized at the same time. A liberalization of inputs ahead of final 
goods leads to increases in effective protection, defeating the very aim of import 
liberalization. For this reason the strategy chosen for trade liberalization has to be 
designed to avoid such spikes in protection as the tariff reduction process goes forward.  
 
Finally, the exchange rate regime must be supportive of the proper sequence of import 
liberalization. A reduction of import tariffs with a non-competitive exchange rate would 
amount to a subsidy for imports because domestic prices of exportables and non-tradables 
remain unaltered. Such a situation is neither credible nor sustainable. Many countries that 
have not moved on the exchange rate front had to abandon liberalization in mid-stream 
leading to disappointments for policy makers as well as the domestic producers who saw 
opportunities to become more competitive in both import substituting industries and 
exports.  
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Notwithstanding concerns by the GOE over the revenue impact and factor market effects 
of any tariff reform program, the results of this study point to a number of ameliorating 
factors influencing the outcome of liberalization. The fiscal revenue impact of a trade 
reform program is unlikely to be severe if there are concurrent broad-based tax reforms. 
Without these accompanying reforms, a program that reduces the average tariff rate, 
lowers tariff dispersions, limits exemptions, and moves towards a uniform rate could 
possibly lower tariff revenue in the short run, but it could also increase revenue in the 
medium term as trade liberalization spurs economic growth and generates a larger tax 
base in the economy. An accompanying currency devaluation would also expand 
imported values measured in domestic currency for purposes of valuation of valuation 
and help to increase tax revenue. Moreover, with lower rates and fewer tariff exemptions, 
collection rates would be likely to improve and lower the incidence of under invoicing 
and smuggling.  
 
Disruptions in factor markets, especially that of labor, are also likely to be small. Given 
the estimated labor turnover rates at the industry level, labor adjustments would probably 
be small even the reform package were implemented over a relatively short period of 
time. Moreover, if past experience of other developing countries is a guide, then the 
degree of labor market adjustment has been relatively small compared with the natural 
dynamics of the labor force. For capital movements, adjustments in foreign investment 
will tend to follow the reduction in the number of protected sectors. Since there is strong 
evidence that trade reforms and macroeconomic stability have a much more positive 
impact on FDI inflows than protected industries, customs duty exemptions, and tax 
holidays for foreign investors, Egypt’s favorable macroeconomic climate and proposed 
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trade policy reforms should stimulate foreign investment inflows into the country’s true 
comparative advantage industries. 
 
Finally, any tariff reform package will necessary depend on the economic constraints to 
adjustments. For Egypt, tariff reform would be greatly constrained by the overvalued 
exchange rate and the regulatory environment, especially those that represent NTBs to 
trade. Without a significant liberalization of the exchange market, it would be difficult to 
move to reverse the current account imbalance and attract foreign investment that relied 
in any way on foreign inputs. Without improvements in the regulatory environment both 
importers and exporters will be subject to cumbersome procedures for the clearing of 
goods and the administration of quality standards. The fact that Egypt already enjoys 
macroeconomic stability would greatly benefit the transition to a new tariff regime and 
help to ensure a predicable situation during the transition to the new regime.  
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